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DEVELOPING TRENDS WITH THE CLASS
ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005
STEVEN M. PUISZIS*

INTRODUCTION

The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005' (CAFA) is Congress'
latest attempt to curb abusive class action practices occurring in
state courts. In 1995, Congress determined that meritless class
action litigation was undermining the national securities
markets. 2 Nuisance filings, vexatious discovery requests and
"manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients whom they
purportedly represent," were several of the abuses identified
which, according to the Congressional Report, resulted in
"extortionate settlements.'
In response, Congress enacted the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act4 (PSLRA) "to provide
uniform standards for class actions and other suits alleging fraud
in the securities market."' Among other things, PSLRA imposed
heightened pleading standards, an automatic stay of proceedings
during the pendency of a motion to dismiss, the elimination of
joint and several liability in the absence of a knowing violation of
. J.D., 1979, Loyola University of Chicago Schcol of
Law, B.S.C., 1976,
DePaul University. Mr. Puiszis is a partner in the Chicago office of Hinshaw
& Culbertson LLP, and is a member of his firm's Business Litigation Practice
Group and Electronic Discovery Committee. He is the current President of the
Illinois Association of Defense Counsel. Mr. Puiszis' publications include
ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY (LEXIS Publishing, 2d ed. 2001), and
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.: Will The Peremptory Challenge Survive Its
Battle With the Equal Protection Clause? 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 37 (1991).
Before joining Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Mr. Puiszis served as a prosecutor
in the criminal and special prosecution divisions of the Cook County State's
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employed as an associate with Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.
1. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (recognizing
that meritless securities litigation had caused "unlimited and unfair risk" and
injured the U.S. economy as a whole).
3. Id. at 26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4 (2000).
5. Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Co., 251 F.3d 101, 107 (2d. Cir.
2001).
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the securities laws, a limitation on fees and expenses available to
class counsel, and disclosure requirements to class members.
Faced with PSLRA's new substantive and procedural hurdles,
plaintiffs "simply abandoned [the] use of federal court[s]" and
brought their class actions "in state courts under state securities
laws .
Three years later, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) after "considerable
evidence" was presented that securities class actions were being
shifted from federal to state courts, preventing PSLRA from fully
achieving its intended purpose.7 A joint House-Senate Report
concluded that "the decline in federal securities class action
lawsuits that occurred after the passage of PSLRA was
accompanied by a nearly identical increase in state court filings."'
SLUSA closed PSLRA's state-court loophole by amending
section 16 of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 28 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 so that any "covered class action"
involving a "covered security" was preempted and subject to
SLUSA's mandatory removal provisions.9 As a result of SLUSA,
federal courts are now the primary forum for most class actions
involving allegations of fraud in the purchase or sale of nationallytraded securities.
In Congress' view, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(CAFA) is "a modest, balanced step" that addresses "some of the
most egregious problems in class action practice."" When judged
against SLUSA and PSLRA's more onerous provisions, that
assessment is certainly true. Congress itself acknowledged that
CAFA was "not intended to be a 'panacea' that will correct all class
action abuses."" Contrary to popular belief, CAFA does not confer
a broad right to be in federal court." As the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded, while Congress' goal in enacting CAFA was to
"increase access to federal courts," and while Congress may have
instructed courts "to construe the bill's terms broadly," those
"general sentiments do not provide carte blanche for federal
jurisdiction over [any] state class action."13 Rather, CAFA was
intended to impact class-action practice in five ways:

6. Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 332 F.3d 116, 123
(2d Cir. 2003).
7. Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2(2)-(3).
8. Lander, 251 F.3d at 108, citing H.R. REP. No. 105-803 (1998) (Conf.
Rep.).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(p)(c), 77bb(f)(1).
10. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 5 (2005), as reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6.
11. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. Plubell v. Merck & Co., Inc., 434 F.3d 1070, 1073 (8th Cir. 2006).
13. Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc. (Pritchett1), 404 F.3d 1232, 1237 n.6

(10th Cir. 2005).
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(1)

Expanding federal diversity jurisdiction to cover statecourt class actions having 100 or more class membersl4
where the amount in controversy has an aggregate value
in excess of $5,000,000,15 and minimal diversity exists
between any class member and any defendant."6

(2)

Enhancing the ability to remove state-court class actions to
federal court by eliminating several of the traditional
barriers to removal,17 and by authorizing an accelerated
appellate review of orders granting or denying a motion to
remand a class action to state court. 18

(3)

Treating certain "mass actions" as if they were "class
actions,"19 and by treating unincorporated associations as if
they were a corporation for purposes of its class action
diversity and removal rules. °

(4)

Revising the settlement procedures for federal-court class
actions by requiring that defendants send notice of any
"proposed settlement"2' to the "appropriate State official of
each State in which a class member resides" 2' and to an
"appropriate Federal official." 3

(5)

Regulating class action settlements by limiting fee awards
to class counsel in "coupon settlements" to the value of
coupons actually redeemed, 4 by requiring with "net loss"
settlements that the "non-monetary benefits to the class
member[s] substantially outweigh the monetary loss "25
resulting from such a settlement and by prohibiting
settlements where the amount paid to a class member
varies depending upon a person's "geographic proximity to
the court."

14. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(b) (Supp. 2005).
15. § 1332(d)(2).
16. Id.; see also Hart v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 457 F.3d 675,
676-77 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that minimal diversity under CAFA only
requires that any member of the plaintiff class be a "citizen of a state different
from any defendant").
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (Supp. 2005).
18. § 1453(c)(1)-(2); see S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 49, as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,46.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11).
20. § 1332(d)(10).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (Supp. 2005).
22. § 1715(a)(2).
23. Id. § 1715(a)(1).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (Supp. 2005).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1713 (Supp. 2005).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1714 (Supp. 2005).
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In 2003, Congress substantially revised Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. CAFA was initially drafted
years before Rule 23 was amended, 7 which explains why Section 7
of CAFA provides that Rule 23's amendments "shall take effect on
the date of enactment of this Act or on December 1,
2003 ... whichever occurs first."28 Additionally, this also explains
why several of CAFA's other provisions mirror Rule 23's amended
requirements. While CAFA does not alter Rule 23's substantive
requirements for class certification,' it does change several of the
procedural requirements regarding the removal, remand and
settlement of quahfying class actions.
This article identifies various legal issues and practical
problems that will be encountered when attempting to navigate
the complexities of CAFA's statutory provisions. It reviews those
decisions that have addressed CAFA's various provisions since its
enactment. This article also explains when legislative history can
be used to clarify CAFA's ambiguities in light of the contradictory
district court decisions that have addressed that issue. Finally,
despite the fact that CAFA was not intended to apply
retroactively," this article discusses strategies and arguments that
have been at least partially successful in applying CAFA to class
actions filed in state court prior to its enactment, and suggests an
alternative to the current approach for determining when a class
action is commenced for purposes of CAFA.3"

27. See The Class Action FairnessAct of 1999: Hearings on S. 353, Before
Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary,106th Cong. 98 (1999).
28. Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 7 (2005).
29. See Ritti v. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., No. 05-4182, 2006 WL 1117878, at *6
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2006) (refusing to certify a class in a lawsuit brought
pursuant to CAFA where plaintiff could not meet Rule 23's typicality and
predominance requirements).
30. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 2-3, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 4-5
(discussing CAFA's legislative history). Among other things, the Senate
Committee Report explains: 'The Senate began consideration of the Class
Action Fairness Act in the 105th Congress when the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Court's convened a
hearing on October 30, 1997." Id. at 2. The Report notes that on September
28, 1998, the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight approved S. 2083,
the Class Action Fairness Act of 1997. Id. The Committee Report then traces
subsequent congressional activity on CAFA through its introduction in the
Senate on January 25, 2005 as the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. Id. at 3.
31. Currently, federal courts rely on relation-back principles drawn from
state law to determine when a class action is "commenced." Under that
approach, if an amendment to a class action filed after CAFA's effective date
relates back to the original pre-CAFA pleading for purposes of a statute of
limitations analysis, a new action is not deemed to have commenced and the
action cannot be removed to federal court under CAFA. Where a new claim in
an amended pleading does not relate back, its filing is deemed to have
commenced a new action triggering the right to remove under CAFA. As this

Developing Trends in CAFA

2006]

I.

USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

CAFA is not a particularly well-drafted piece of federal
legislation. The Ninth Circuit found the wording of its "mass
action" provisions to be "clumsy" and "confusing." 2 The Tenth
Circuit concluded that CAFA's accelerated appellate review
provisions contained a drafting error, which presented one of those
"rare cases" where the text of a statute was "demonstrably at
odds" with the intention of Congress. 3 A brief review of CAFA
reveals that several of its significant terms and phrases were left
undefined, and that it fails to address any number of issues
involving diversity jurisdiction and removal proceedings that have
historically arisen in federal court litigation. Thus, court and
counsel must reconcile the interplay of CAFA's jurisdictional and
removal provisions in light of the Act's intended purpose with preCAFA decisions addressing those issues in a different statutory
context. The question then is: What role can CAFA's legislative
history play in that endeavor?
A court is obligated to "interpret the words of [a] statute in
light of the purposes Congress sought to serve."34 In this regard
Congress could not have been more clear:
One of the primary historical reasons for diversity jurisdiction is the
reassurance of fairness and competence that a federal court can
supply to an out-of-state defendant facing suit in state court.
Because interstate class actions typically involve more people, more
money, and more interstate commerce ramifications than any other
type of lawsuit, the Committee [on the Judiciary] firmly believes
that such cases properly belong in federal court.35
But, the use of legislative history is not without its limitations. It
is equally clear that where a statute "is plain and unambiguous on
its face," courts have been instructed not to "look to legislative
history as a guide to its meaning."36 "The plain meaning of
legislation should be conclusive, except in the 'rare cases [in
which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.'""
article explains, such an approach raises a number of complex issues, and
because various state relation back laws are not uniform in their approach or
interpretation, it could potentially lead to contradictory outcomes upon
removal, depending upon the particulars of the state law that is applied.
32. Abrego v. Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2006) (per

curiam).
33. Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc. (Pritchett I/), 420 F.3d 1090, 1094 n.2

(10th Cir. 2005).
34. Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.
Co. of Va., 464 U.S. 30, 36 (1983).
35. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 5, 5 n.1, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6
(internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29 (1978).
37. United States v. Ron Pair Enters. Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)
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In view of the uncertainties created by CAFA's use of
undefined terms and its silence on various issues, this article
refers to the Senate Judiciary Committee Report in an attempt to
close several of CAFA's gaps.' As the Supreme Court has
recognized: "There is a basic difference between filling a gap left
by Congress' silence and rewriting rules that Congress has
However, the Seventh
affirmatively and specifically enacted."9
Circuit recently concluded that mere reliance on "naked legislative
history," which does not correspond to any statutory provision
4
cannot effectively change the judicial interpretation of a statute.
The Ninth Circuit similarly concluded: "CAFA's silence, coupled
with a sentence in a legislative committee report untethered to
any statutory language, does not alter the longstanding rule that
the party seeking federal jurisdiction on removal bears the burden
Simply put, "a committee
of establishing that jurisdiction."
report cannot serve as an independent statutory source having the
force of law."42
Thus, while legislative history may be used to interpret
ambiguous provisions of CAFA, it cannot be used to change the
meaning of the statute itself. Additionally, where a statement in
the Senate Committee Report cannot be linked to one of CAFA's
specific statutory provisions, it may ultimately prove to be of
minimal value when used to support a change in the judicial
interpretation of a point of law addressed in the Report.' A court

(quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
38. See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 AFL-CIO v. Laidlaw
Transit Servs., Inc., 435 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying the Senate
Judiciary Committee Report to clarify an ambiguity in CAFA's accelerated
appellate review provisions).
39. Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004) (quoting Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)).
40. See Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir.
2005) (rejecting the approach that had been taken by various district courts
which had relied upon CAFA's legislative history in concluding that CAFA
changed the parties' initial burden of proof on removal because of the Act's
silence on the issue).
41. Abrego, 443 F.3d at 686 (per curiam); see also American Hosp. Ass'n v.
NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 617 (1991) ("[Llegislative history that cannot be tied to
the enactment of specific statutory language ordinarily carries little weight on
the judicial interpretation of the statute." (citing Public Employees Ret. Sys. of
Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989))).
42. Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1328 (11th Cir. 2006)
(quoting United States v. Thigpen, 4 F.3d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1993) (en
banc)) (emphasis in original).
43. Compare Brill, 427 F.3d at 446, with Hart, 457 F.3d at 680-81
(observing "for the sake of completeness," that its conclusion was "consistent
with the legislative history of CAFA" as expressed in the Senate Judiciary
Committee Report). In Hart, the Seventh Circuit concluded that once the
removing defendant initially demonstrates that removal under CAFA was
proper, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing one of CAFA's
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has "'no authority to enforce principles gleaned solely from
legislative history that has no statutory reference point."'"
Committee reports "represen[t] the considered and collective
understanding of those [legislators involved in drafting and
studying proposed legislation." To the extent it is appropriate to
consider legislative history when engaged in statutory
interpretation, committee reports are viewed as the "authoritative
However, as the
source" for determining legislative intent."
Supreme Court recognized in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Services, Inc.," even committee reports can be abused and should
not be employed in the absence of ambiguity. Most district courts
that have been called upon to interpret a specific provision of
CAFA have relied on its legislative history and the Senate
Committee Report for guidance except where a particular
provision was found to be unambiguous.
II.

EXPANSION OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER CLASS ACTIONS

CAFA expands federal jurisdiction over class actions in
several distinct and different ways.
The Act: requires only
minimal diversity for qualifying class actions; changes how
diversity is determined for qualifying class actions; permits
aggregating the value of all potential class members claims for
purposes of its amount-in-controversy requirement; requires
diversity determinations well beyond the traditional date of filing
rule; and treats unincorporated associations like corporations.
A. Expansion of Diversity Jurisdictionfor
Class Actions Covered by CAFA
Section 4 of CAFA expands federal diversity jurisdiction to
potentially include (with certain limitations discussed below) any
jurisdictional exceptions. Id. at 681. There is no apparent inconsistency in the
Seventh Circuit's rejection of the use of the Senate Committee Report in Brill,
and its reference to it in Hart. Rather it affirms that the Report can be
employed so long as it is not being used to contradict a preexisting judicial
interpretation of the relevant point of law. Indeed, as the Supreme Court in
Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 698 (2003), observed,
"[slince 1948... there has been no question that whenever the subject matter
of an action qualifies it for removal, the burden is on a plaintiff to find an
express exception." Thus, Brill and Hart provide two guideposts to follow
when determining if legislative history can be used in addressing CAFA's
ambiguities. Court and counsel should also bear in mind that this limitation
on the use of legislative history is triggered when the Report cannot be tied to
one of CAFA's provisions.
44. Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1328 (quoting Thigpen, 4 F.3d at 1577 (quoting
Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union No. 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 712
(D.C. Cir. 1987))) (emphasis in original).
45. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969).
46. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984).
47. 545 U.S. 546, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 2625-2627 (2005).
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class action having 100 or more class members where the "matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of
interest and costs," and any plaintiff class member is diverse from
any defendant.4
The term "class action" is defined by CAFA as "any civil
action filed under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure " 49 or a "similar state statute or rule of judicial
procedure" that authorizes the filing of a class action. ° The term
"class member" includes those "persons (named or unnamed) who
fall within the definition of the proposed or certified class."51 Thus,
CAFA's provisions are generally applicable to state-court actions
before a class is certified. 2
CAFA is not triggered simply because a party is suing in a
"representative capacity," the type of relief sought resembles what
is traditionally available in a class action, or a favorable judgment
would benefit parties not before the court. Rather, the suit must
be "filed under Rule 23 or a similar state statute as a class
action. " ' Similarly, CAFA does not encompass enforcement actions
seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief brought by state
attorney generals pursuant to state laws designed to protect a
state's citizens.' While a "parens patriae"55 action may resemble a
class action in that an attorney general is representing a state's
citizens, it is not considered a class action within CAFA's reach.
Thus, where a lawsuit is not filed as a class action, CAFA does not
apply even if for all intents and purposes it resembles one.

48. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (Supp. 2005); Plubell, 434 F.3d at 1071.
49. FED. R. CIv. P. 23.
50. See 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(1)(B). Where a state's substantive law does not
authorize the filing of a class action for a particular type of claim, a party
'cannot invoke diversity jurisdiction under CAFA" to achieve a different result
in federal court. Bonime v. Avaya, Inc., No. 06 CV 1630 (CBA), 2006 WL
3751219 at *2-5, (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2006) (addressing a New York law that
prohibits the recovery of a penalty or "minimum measure of recovery" in a
class action unless the statute creating the penalty or imposing a minimum
recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action suit). In
Bonime, because the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C.
§ 227, did not authorize the recovery of statutory damages in a class action, a
class action for a purported violation of the TCPA could not be brought in New
York state court and CAFA could not be invoked to trigger diversity
jurisdiction to pursue a TCPA class action in federal court.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B), (D).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8); Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1327.
53. Tedder v. Beverly Enters., Inc., No. 3:05CV00264SWW, 2005 WL
3409587, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 12, 2005) (remanding to state court a suit
seeking injunctive relief to block a merger and the imposition of a constructive
trust over defendant's liability reserves, because CAFA does not apply to
"lawsuits that resemble class actions").
54. Harvey v. Blockbuster, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 749, 754 (D.N.J. 2005).
55. Id. at 753.
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B. Aggregation of Value Permittedfor Qualifying ClassActions
In Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co.,' the Supreme Court held
that all members of a federal class action brought pursuant to
diversity jurisdiction had to meet § 1332's amount-in-controversy
requirement.57 Although each of the named class representatives'
claims met diversity's amount-in-controversy requirement, not all
of the individual class member's claims reached that jurisdictional
threshold. Therefore, the district court refused to certify a class,
concluding it would not be feasible to define a class of persons
whose individual claims met § 1332's amount-in-controversy
requirement.' The Court in Zahn reaffirmed its prior holding in
59
Snyder v. Harris
to the effect "that there may be no aggregation
and that the entire case must be dismissed where none of the
plaintiffs' claims" meet the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy
threshold.' Zahn further elaborated that "any plaintiff without
the jurisdictional amount must be dismissed from the case, even
though others allege jurisdictionally sufficient claims." 1
Zahn's jurisdictional holding and the corresponding notion
that the value of the putative class member's claims could not be
aggregated to meet § 1332's jurisdictional requirement have been
Section 1332(d)(6) now
eliminated by Section 4 of CAFA.
specifically provides: "In any class action, the claims of the
individual class members shall be aggregated to determine
whether the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$5,000,000 exclusive of interest and costs." 2
Additionally, in Exxon Mobil, the Supreme Court significantly
expanded the scope of a district court's supplemental jurisdiction.
Exxon Mobil resolved a split in the circuits over whether the
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, which clarified the
supplemental jurisdiction of federal courts, had overruled Zahn.'
Exxon Mobil held, in the context of a class action based upon
diversity jurisdiction, that where the claim of at least one plaintiff
reaches the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy threshold, so long
as the other elements of diversity jurisdiction are met, a district
court has supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other class
members that do not meet § 1332's amount-in-controversy

56. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
57. Id. at 300-02.
58. Id. at 292.
59. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
60. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 300.
61. Id.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (Supp. 2005).
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. For an excellent and lighthearted discussion of
the split in the circuits on this issue prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Exxon Mobil, see Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495, 499-508 (6th Cir.
2004).
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requirement." Thus, Exxon Mobil's holding essentially overturned
Zahn. While CAFA had no bearing on the Court's analysis in
Exxon Mobil, the Court did recognize that it "abrogates the rule
against aggregating claims."
Where a plaintiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief, "it is
well established that the amount in controversy is measured by
the object of the litigation."' The Seventh Circuit has explained
that when injunctive relief is sought, "the jurisdictional amount
should be assessed [by] looking at either the benefit to the plaintiff
or the cost to the defendant" in complying with the requested
injunctive relief." The Seventh Circuit refers to this as the "either
viewpoint"" rule.'
The Senate Judicary Committee Report
endorses this either viewpoint approach when assessing the
aggregate value of the class members' claims "regardless of the
type of relief sought.""
Not all federal circuits follow the either viewpoint rule."
64. 125 S. Ct. at 2620.
65. Id. at 2627-28. In light of Exxon Mobil, one strategy defendants have
pursued is to seek removal under both CAFA and traditional diversity
jurisdiction by arguing that the district court has supplemental jurisdiction
over all class action claims where at least one plaintiff meets the diversity
amount-in-controversy threshold. E.g., Hooks v. Am. Med. Sec. Life Ins. Co.,
No. 3:06-CV-00071, 2006 WL 2504903 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 29, 2006); Moore v.
Genesco, Inc., No. C 06-3897 SBA, 2006 WL 2691390 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20,
2006). When doing so, care should be taken to establish the basis of the
court's jurisdiction under both jurisdictional prongs, and include any "specific
facts supporting jurisdiction based on CAFA." Hooks, 2006 WL 2504903, at
*4. 28 U.S.C. § 1653 provides that "[d]effective allegations ofjurisdiction may
be amended, upon terms, in the trial or appellate courts." Section 1653 has
been applied to removal petitions. See McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic, 150 F.3d
651, 654 (7th Cir. 1998). A defendant may amend a notice of removal within
thirty days of its filing to correct factual information upon which the
jurisdictional allegations are based; but, after thirty days, only technical
defects can be corrected - not substantive defects in the notice's jurisdictional
allegations. See, e.g., Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 512 (5th
Cir. 1985); see also Alsup v. 3-Day Blinds, Inc., 435 F.Supp.2d 838, 844 n.2
(S.D. Ill. 2006) (noting that a notice of removal may be amended more than
thirty days after the time to remove has expired "only to set out more
specifically the grounds for removal that have already been stated, albeit
imperfectly in the original notice").
66. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977).
67. Uhl v. Thoroughbred Tech. & Telecomm., Inc., 309 F.3d 978, 983 (7th
Cir. 2002).

68. Id.
69. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 42 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
40.
70. For a discussion of the split in the circuits over which viewpoint rule
should govern how the amount in controversy is determined, see Brittain
Shaw McInnis, The $75,000.01 Question: What is the Value of Injunctive
Relief?, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013, 1020-23 (1998) (noting the First, Fourth,
Seventh, Tenth and D.C. Circuits follow the either viewpoint rule, while the
Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits follow the plaintiff
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Additionally, at least one circuit that follows the either viewpoint
approach in single plaintiff actions, does not follow that rule in
cases where there are multiple plaintiffs, unless they are seeking
"to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and
undivided interest.7 The premise for the various circuits' rejection
of the either viewpoint approach appears to be principally based
on Zahn and Snyder's non-aggregation rule." However, because
under CAFA, class members' claims may now be aggregated, the
either viewpoint approach should now be applied even in those
circuits which have previously rejected that approach.73 Because
the Senate Judiciary Committee's endorsement of the either
viwepoint approach can be linked to § 1332(d)(6)'s aggregation
rule, it should withstand any challenge based upon the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Brill and the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Abrego,"4 which addressed the proper use of legislative history.
Where injunctive relief is the sole remedy sought in a class
action, the Seventh Circuit has instructed courts to look
"separately at each named plaintiffs claim and the cost to the
defendant of complying with an injunction directed to that
plaintiff."75 The analysis of each plaintiffs claim ensured that
courts would not undermine "the nonaggregation rule that still
applies to class actions where the named plaintiffs claim does not
satisfy the jurisdictional amount."" The aggregation rule found in
§ 1332(d)(6) of CAFA and the Supreme Court's recent Exxon Mobil
decision, however, have implicitly rejected the Seventh Circuit's
separate analysis approach for class actions involving injunctive
relief. Even without CAFA's "value-aggregation rule," so long as
one of the named plaintiffs can demonstrate a jurisdictionally
viewpoint rule). The Sixth Circuit has not expressed a preference for either
approach. See Olden, 383 F.3d at 502 n.1 ("This Circuit has not yet chosen an
approach and we decline to weigh in on two major Circuit splits in the same
day.").
71. Lovell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 466 F.3d 893, 897-98 (10th Cir.
2006) (quoting Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335); see also Kanter v. Warner-Lambert
Co., 265 F.3d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Therefore, in class actions asserting
the 'separate and distinct' claims of class members as opposed to claims that
are the 'common and undivided' right of the class, the defendant's viewpoint
approach [is] inappropriate.").
72. See, e.g., Kanter, 265 F.3d at 859 ("We explained that in class actions,
use of the defendant's viewpoint approach was 'basically the same as
aggregation.' (quoting Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir.
1977))).

73. See, e.g., Yeroushalmi v. Blockbuster Inc., No. CV 05-225-AHM(RCX),
2005 WL 2083008, at *3 n.4 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2005) (noting that the Ninth
Circuit had rejected the either viewpoint approach, and holding "[iut is clear
that CAFA overrules the circuit's position on this point insofar as qualifying
class actions are concerned"); see also Lovell, 466 F.3d at 897 n. 4.
74. 443 F.3d at 685-86.
75. Uhl, 309 F.3d at 983.

76. Id.
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sufficient claim when examined from "either viewpoint," a district
court should have supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
claims following Exxon Mobil."
The Senate Judiciary Committee recognized the potential
difficulties that can occur when attempting to place a value on
non-monetary relief sought in a class action.
Their Report
indicates that it was the Committee's intent that this provision
should be "interpreted expansively," that any assessment include
"the value of all relief and benefits that would logically flow" from
the relief sought, and if any doubts existed as to whether the class
members' claims reach CAFA's aggregate threshold, "the court
should err in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the case.""8 For
example, a declaration that a product is defective could easily
meet CAFA's aggregate threshold depending upon the number of
products that had been sold and the costs associated with a recall
and repair of the product. 9 Moreover, even prior to CAFA,
punitive damages could also be considered in determining the
amount in controversy. 80 This remains true under CAFA.
C. Only Minimal Diversity Requiredfor Qualifying Class Actions.
While the requirement of complete diversity was neither
constitutionally mandated by Article III, nor specifically required
by the text of § 1332,"' the Supreme Court "has consistently
interpreted § 1332 as requiring complete diversity."82 However,
"the grant of diversity jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution
permits the federal courts to decide cases with only 'minimal'
diversity - that is, just one party with citizenship different from
all others. " ' The Seventh Circuit recently explained that
Congress can "expand or contract the statutory diversity
jurisdiction" of federal courts, and "[flor many years, it has
permitted minimal diversity suits under the federal interpleader

77. 125 S. Ct. at 2620.
78. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 42-43, as reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 40-41.

79. Cf In re Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litigation, 436 F. Supp.
2d 687, 690 (D. Del. 2006) (noting that CAFA's aggregate monetary threshold

was met even when the court considered only the average price of a
microprocessor rather than the entire computer, given the number of
computers containing the microprocessor sold to households in the class area
and in light of the treble damages and attorneys being sought, which can be
considered in determining if CAFA's aggregate threshold has been met).
80. See Bell v. Preferred Life Assur. Soc'y, 320 U.S. 238, 240 (1943) (noting
that both actual and punitive damages were recoverable under a complaint

and "each must be considered to the extent claimed in determining
jurisdictional amount").
81. Exxon Mobil, 125 S. Ct. at 2617.
82. Id.
83. Hart, 457 F.3d at 676 (citing State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967)).
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statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335. " " Congress adopted that same approach
for class actions having 100 or more class members in CAFA.'
The requirement of complete diversity has been abandoned
for class actions encompassed by CAFA. All that is now required
for a qualifying class action is minimal diversity - "any member
of a class of plaintiffs [being] a citizen of a State different from any
defendant."' CAFA, however, was not intended to "alter current
7
law regarding how the citizenship of a person is determined.",
The long-standing rule for determining diversity of
citizenship in class actions was that a court looked to the domicile
of the named class representatives rather than the putative class
members.'
Complete diversity was only required between the
named plaintiffs and the named defendants in a federal class
action based upon diversity. 9
CAFA's directive that the
citizenship of plaintiff class members be examined changes the
traditional rule, and should eliminate any attempt to collusively
name a class representative in order to either dodge or invoke
federal diversity jurisdiction.
Additionally, CAFA's section 4
provides that diversity jurisdiction for a class action can be met
where either "any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state
or a citizen or subject of a foreign state," or where "any defendant
is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state."'
It bears mentioning that diversity jurisdiction is based on a
person's domicile, not his residency.91 Allegations of the parties'
"residence," not their citizenship, is an "obvious shortcoming" that
does not establish diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.2
This remains true under CAFA. "Allegations of residency but not
citizenship are insufficient to determine the existence of diversity
jurisdiction" for purposes of CAFA.93
In one extreme case,

84. 457 F.3d at 676-77.
85. Id.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A); Plubell, 434 F.3d at 1071.
87. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 36, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 34.
However, § 1332(d)(10) clearly modifies how the citizenship of unincorporated
associations is determined for purposes of CAFA.
88. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1929).
89. See, e.g., Snyder, 394 U.S. at 340 (requiring complete diversity only
between the named plaintiffs and named defendants in a federal class action);
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 162 (2d Cir. 1987)
(discussing the consequence that would follow an overruling of the aggregation
doctrine with regards to federal diversity in a class action suit).
90. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(B)-(C) (Supp. 2005).
91. See, e.g., Denlinger v. Brennan, 87 F.3d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1996)
(explaining citizenship for diversity purposes "means domicile rather than
residence" which requires a voluntary "physical presence in a state with [the]
intent to remain there"); Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646, 650 (1878)
(explaining citizenship and residency are not synonymous terms).
92. Tylka v. Gerber Products Co., 211 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2000).
93. See Baldwin v. Monier Lifetile, L.L.C., No. CIV05-1058PHXJAT, 2005
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defendant's notice of removal, which merely alleged that plaintiffs
were "residents of the State of Arizona," was held not to have even
established minimal diversity under CAFA.'
D. Timing Of The Diversity Determination
Historically, whether diversity exists is determined as of the
date the complaint is filed.95 Similarly, removal jurisdiction is
determined based on the pleadings as they existed at the time of
removal.'
While that approach remains generally true for
defendants under CAFA, 97 § 1332(d)(7) requires that diversity
WL 3334344, at *2-3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 7, 2005) (remanding an action because
CAFA's minimal diversity requirement was not apparent from the face of the
plaintiffs' complaint or defendant's notice of removal, neither of which
established the citizenship or domicile of any of the parties).
94. Id. at *1. But see Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir.
2006) (addressing a complaint alleging the named plaintiff was a resident of
New York and that thousands of New York customers were members of the
class). In Galeno, the court took a common sense approach to the issue of
minimal diversity under CAFA and concluded "it seems plain to us that
Blockbuster is able to meet its burden of showing there is a reasonable
probability that at least one of these class members is a citizen of New York
and thus is 'a citizen of a state different from. .. defendant.'" See also
Schwartz v. Comcast Corp. (Schwartz II), No. Civ.A. 05-2340, 2006 WL
487915, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2006) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that the
"home state" or "local controversy" exceptions to CAFA's minimal diversity
rule were triggered because they rested upon the erroneous "assumption that
residence is an effective proxy for domicile"). It is one thing to conclude that at
least one member of the class is diverse from the defendants when the
citizenship or domicile of the putative class members is not asserted or
established in the complaint. It is entirely another to conclude that at least
two thirds of the class members are citizens of the forum state for purposes of
CAFA's home state or local controversy exceptions. When minimal diversity is
the question, one can reach the conclusion that it exists through the use of
common sense. Because the home state and local controversy exceptions
require specific numbers to trigger their application, in the absence of
information as to the citizenship or domicile of the putative class members,
the mandated two-third's calculation would rest on mere speculation. See,
e.g., Martin v. Lafon Nursing Facility of the Holy Family, Inc., No. 60-5108,
2007 WL 162813, at *2-3 (E.D. La., Jan. 18, 2007) (holding an assertion that
the majority of the class members are from Louisiana did not establish the
local controversy exception).
95. See, e.g., Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 478 (2003) ("It is
well settled, for example, that federal diversity jurisdiction depends upon the
citizenship of the parties at the time suit is filed."); Navarro Savings Assn. v.
Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 459-60 (1980) (same).
96. Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537 (1939).
97. See, e.g., Moniz v. Bayer A.G., 447 F. Supp. 2d 31, 36 (D. Mass. 2006)
(explaining that once jurisdiction is acquired under CAFA, plaintiffs'
abandonment of their new claim that triggered the removal would not divest
the district court of jurisdiction). Additionally, the district court in Moniz held
that a putative settlement of another multi-state class action that would
resolve all of the class members' claims involving the newly added claim would
also not divest jurisdiction under CAFA once it had been acquired. Id.
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determinations involving "members of the proposed plaintiff
classes," be made at several other stages of a class-action
proceeding. Section 1332(d)(7) provides that for class actions
encompassed by the Act:
Citizenship of the members of the proposed plaintiff classes shall be
determined... as of the date of filing of the complaint or amended
complaint, or, if the case stated by the initial pleading is not subject
to Federal jurisdiction, as of the date of service by plaintiffs of an
amended pleading, motion
or other paper, indicating the existence of
98
Federal jurisdiction.
Several points bear mentioning about the text of § 1332(d)(7).
First, Congress' use of the word "shall" signals a legislative intent
that the determinations of the plaintiffs' citizenship are
mandatory. Second, § 1332(d)(7) contains no time limitation.
Thus, it is possible that a determination of the citizenship of the
plaintiff class members could be triggered immediately prior to the
trial of a state-court action by the filing of a pleading or paper
which indicates for the first time that jurisdiction over the action
is available under CAFA. Finally, § 1332(d)(7) makes no reference
to determining the citizenship of the defendants. Its sole focus is
on the citizenship of the proposed plaintiff class members. The
potential significance of these points on existing federal practice is
discussed below.
When § 1332(d)(7) is applicable to a class action, several
issues are of immediate concern. First, can a defendant forfeit the
right to invoke federal court jurisdiction by not immediately
removing the case when federal jurisdiction first appeared in the
original or amended pleading, motion, or other paper, in view of
CAFA's intent to broadly expand diversity jurisdiction over class
actions? The short answer is yes, unless a pleading amendment
triggers a new basis to remove, or so materially changes the
nature of the action that it can be characterized as a new suit.' As
explained below, while section 5 of CAFA eliminates 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b)'s one year absolute time limitation on removal currently, a notice of removal in a diversity action must be filed
within one year of the commencement of the action - it leaves
undisturbed § 1446(b)'s requirement that a notice of removal must

98. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(7) (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added).

99. Braud v. Transp. Serv. Co. of Ill., 445 F.3d 801, 806 (5th Cir. 2006)
(citing 14C CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3732, at 311-48 (2006)); see
also In re Audi Litigation, No. 05-CV-4698, 2006 WL 1543752, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Jun. 1, 2006) (rejecting defendant's argument that removal was timely where

"the addition of the strict liability claim had [no] bearing on the relevant
jurisdictional prerequisites: the supplement did not change the parties'

citizenship, and the amount-in-controversy requirement already had been
met").
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be filed within thirty days of receiving a pleading or paper which
provides the initial basis for removal."° A contrary rule would
permit a defendant to sit back, assess a state-court judge's rulings,
and if those rulings were unfavorable remove the action to federal
court at a later date. CAFA was intended to expand federal
jurisdiction over "large" class actions, not allow for forum
shopping.
Second, § 1332(d)(7) is not expressly limited to proceedings
prior to removal. As discussed below, CAFA's revised diversity
rules permit a district court to decline jurisdiction based upon
certain enumerated factors including the number of putative class
members who reside in the forum state."
Section 1332(d)(7)
seemingly requires that the citizenship of plaintiff class members
be reassessed even after removal, and federal jurisdiction could be
lost by the filing of an amended pleading which triggers any of
CAFA's one-third/two-thirds jurisdictional exceptions.
Section 1332(d)(7) mandates that citizenship of the plaintiff
class members be evaluated at various times during the life of the
class action - as of the filing date for either: (1) the complaint; (2)
an amended complaint; or, (3) where the initial pleading is not
subject to federal jurisdiction, "as of the date of service" of an
"amended pleading, motion or other paper indicating the existence
of federal jurisdiction." Perhaps CAFA's drafters did not intend
this result, but its reference to an "amended complaint" (item 2) is
not necessarily the same as an amended pleading that "indicate[s]
the existence of federal jurisdiction" (item 3). Otherwise, the
timing triggers created by items (2) and (3) would be redundant.
Thus, the amended complaint (item 2) referenced in § 1332(d)(7)
by definition could be one that does not "indicat[e] the existence of
federal jurisdiction." Otherwise, there would be no need to refer to
an amended pleading in item (3). Accordingly, the filing of an
amended complaint following removal would seemingly require
diversity
determination
because
§ 1332(d)(7)'s
another
reassessment requirement is mandatory in nature, and could
result in a determination that the court should decline jurisdiction
over the action. The filing of an amended complaint following
removal mandates a re-examination of the citizenship of the
plaintiff class members and could result in a court declining to
exercise jurisdiction in the event CAFA's one-third/two-thirds
jurisdictional exceptions are met.
Third, can the citizenship of a defendant or group of
defendants be reconsidered at other stages of a class action
§ 1332(d)(7)
only specifies subsequent
proceeding
when
consideration of the citizenship of putative plaintiff class

100. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
101. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)-(4).
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members?
Under CAFA, there is no statutory basis for
reconsideration of a defendant's citizenship after minimal
diversity is established. Had Congress so intended, it could have
readily indicated that the defendants' citizenship should also be
considered as it did with the citizenship of the proposed plaintiff
class members. By specifying that only the citizenship of the
proposed plaintiff class members be considered, subsequent
amendments to a pleading which merely add or subtract a
significant or target defendant from a class action should not
provide a basis for a federal court to decline the exercise of
diversity jurisdiction under CAFA.
District courts generally appear to be following this approach.
Several courts have held that the voluntary dismissal of a
defendant or the filing of an amended pleading that eliminates a
"target" or "significant" defendant, does not trigger a right to
remand that action to state court. 102 "When a plaintiff amends his
complaint after removal in a way that destroys diversity, a district
court must consider the reasons behind the amendment in
determining whether remand is proper. If the plaintiff amended
simply to destroy diversity, the district court should not
remand."' °3
Historically, once federal jurisdiction attached, the mere
substitution of a non-diverse party did not necessarily deprive a
°
district court of diversity jurisdiction.'O
This is especially true
when the defendant that was added to the case was not an
indispensable party at the time the complaint was filed.' 0
However, the Seventh Circuit explained in Estate of Alvarez v.
Donaldson Co. that the subsequent addition of non-diverse
indispensable parties under Rule 19(b) can destroy diversity
jurisdiction, warranting dismissal of a federal action.'" Whether
the holding of Alvarez holds force in light of § 1332(d)(7) remains
102. See, e.g., Braud, 445 F.3d at 808 (reversing a remand order where
minimal diversity remained even after defendant was dismissed following the
removal to federal court); Dinkel v. General Motors Corp., 400 F. Supp. 2d
289, 294 (D. Me. 2005) (holding plaintiff could not obtain a remand by
voluntarily dismissing the defendants who had removed the class action to
federal court); Robinson v. Holiday Universal, Inc., No. H-05-5726, 2006 WL
470592, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2006) (same).
103. Schillinger v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 425 F.3d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 2005)
(citing 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE

§ 3723,

at 591 (1998

and

Supp.)).
104. See Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991)
(per curiam) (explaining that the substitution of a non-diverse party to an
action after determining that diversity jurisdiction existed did not destroy
federal jurisdiction).
105. Id.
106. See Estate of Alvarez v. Donaldson Co., 213 F.3d 993, 995 (7th Cir.

2000).
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to be seen. Given CAFA's minimal diversity rule, the likelihood
appears remote that the addition of an indispensible party as a
defendant would even trigger consideration of the issue.
E. UnincorporatedAssociations are Treated Like Corporations
For diversity purposes, unincorporated business entities and
membership associations assume the citizenship of each of its
members.'
For purposes of CAFA's revised class action diversity
and removal rules, "an unincorporated association is deemed to be
a citizen of the State where it has its principal place of business
and the State under whose laws it is organized.""° Thus, an
unincorporated association is treated like a corporation for
diversity purposes under the Act."°
Traditionally, courts have treated limited liability companies,
labor unions, worker's compensation insurance pools, and even
religious organizations as unincorporated associations for diversity
purposes by considering the citizenship of all of their respective
members.11 °
The citizenship of a partnership is similarly
determined by looking to the citizenship of all partners.'' While
CAFA does not specifically address how those entities are to be
treated for diversity purposes on a going-forward basis, a valid
argument can be made that given CAFA's intended purpose of
enlarging federal jurisdiction over class actions, any entity that
can loosely be described as an unincorporated association or that
was historically treated like an unincorporated association for
diversity purposes should fall within the ambit of § 1332(d)(10)'s
coverage."2 However, until that point is firmly established in the
107. E.g., United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382
U.S. 145, 153 (1965) ;Ind. Gas Co. Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 314, 316
(7th Cir. 1998).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10) (Supp. 2005).
109. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) ("[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a
citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where
it has its principal place of business").
110. See, e.g., Wise v. Wachovia Sec. LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 267 (7th Cir. 2006)
(limited liability company); United Steelworkers, 382 U.S. at 153
(unincorporated labor union); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. United Church of Christ,
410 F. Supp. 2d 637, 638 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (religious organization); Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co. v. Landry Enters., Inc., Civ. A. No. 94-1777, 1995 WL 217468, at *3
(E.D. La. Apr. 12, 1995) (worker's compensation insurance pool).
111. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 197 (1990) (holding a limited
partnership assumes the citizenship of all partners, not just the citizenship of
the general partners).
112. The Supreme Court in Carden, 494 U.S. at 189, reaffirmed "the
doctrinal wall of Chapman v. Barney," 129 U.S. 677 (1889) (involving an
unincorporated "joint stock company"). Carden also reaffirmed "[tihe
tradition of the common law,' which is 'to treat as legal persons only
incorporated groups and to assimilate all others to partnerships." 494 U.S. at
190 (quoting Puerto Rico v. Russel & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 480 (1933)). Carden
also reiterated the point that whether other types of organizations or business
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decisional law interpreting CAFA, the safest approach when
removing an action against one of those entities would be to
specifically assert the citizenship of each individual that comprises
the legal entity whenever possible."'
III. CAFA's Jurisdiction Exemptions
While CAFA expands federal jurisdiction over class actions, it
also contains several potential exceptions to CAFA's jurisdictional
reach. Potentially exempted from CAFA are certain categories of
parties or claims: class actions where the "primary defendants" are
governmental entities; class actions having less than 100
members; class actions solely involving nationally traded
securities; class actions solely directed at internal corporate
affairs; and, class actions solely relating to the rights, duties or
obligationsassociated with a security.
A. Governmental Defendants -

The "State-Action"Exemption

For over 100 years, the rule has been "a state is not a citizen"
for diversity purposes, "4 and the presence of a state in an action
entities should be treated like corporations for diversity purposes "is 'properly
a matter for legislative consideration which cannot adequately or
appropriately be dealt with by this Court.'" 494 U.S. at 196 (quoting United
Steelworkers, 382 U.S. at 147).
The Supreme Court for the most part has drawn an artificial line
between corporations on one hand, and all other types of business
organizations on the other, treating all the same for diversity purposes
depending on which side of the line they fell. Section 1332(d)(10) has now
erased that artificial distinction for qualifying class actions under CAFA.
Given Congress' stated intent of broadly expanding federal jurisdiction over
class actions, any type of business entity that formerly looked to the
citizenship of its members or partners for diversity purposes should now be
deemed to be a citizen only of the States where it has its principal place of
business and under whose laws it was organized. At least one commentator
has adopted this view. See 15 JAMES WM. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 102.56A, at p. 102-132.7 (3d ed. 2006) ("Under the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), the citizenship of partnerships and other
unincorporated entities is essentially equivalent to that corporation."). The
Senate Judiciary Committee Report on § 1332(d)(10) specifically referred to
insurance companies organized as "inter-insurance exchanges" or "reciprocal
insurance associations" as examples of the artificial distinction drawn by the
Supreme Court between corporations and other forms of business entities
which has led to frequent criticisms and anomalous results. S.Rep.No. 109-14
at 41, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 43.
113. See, e.g., Baldwin, 2005 WL 3334344, at *3 (addressing the removal of
an action under CAFA by a limited liability company (LLC) that was
subsequently remanded by the district court because, among other things, the
pleadings failed to establish the citizenship of the individuals or entities that
comprised the defendant LLC).
114. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487 (1891) ("[I]t is well
settled that a suit between a State and a citizen or a corporation of another is
not between citizens of different states").
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destroyed complete diversity." 5 Section 1332(a)(1) in particular
limited diversity jurisdiction to suits between "citizens of different
states."" 6 So the first question is whether CAFA changes that
The answer would seem to be yes."7
historical approach?
Otherwise, there would be no need for a limited jurisdictional
exemption in § 1332(d)(5)(A) for states and state officials who are
"primary defendants." In § 1332(d)(2)(A), CAFA expands diversity
jurisdiction over qualifying class actions where any member of the
plaintiff class "is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant."'18 Where CAFA is invoked, diversity jurisdiction is no
longer limited to actions between citizens of different states."9 The
Fifth Circuit recently reached the opposite conclusion in the
context of rejecting a remand motion based upon the CAFA's local
controversy exception.120 However, the court failed to take into
consideration the text of § 1332(d)(2)(A) which appears to be
unambiguous and seemingly extends diversity jurisdiction under
CAFA over states and state officials.
class action
Section 1332(d)(5)(A) provides that CAFA's
diversity rules do not apply to any action in which "the primary
defendants are States, State officials, or other governmental
entities against whom the district court may be foreclosed from
ordering relief."2' CAFA does not define the term "primary
However, another section of CAFA, 28 U.S.C.
defendants."
§ 1332(d)(4), containing the so-called "home state" and "local
controversy" exceptions, which "mandate" that a district court
decline jurisdiction over a class action, employs the phrase
"primary defendants" in one of those exceptions while also
referring to defendants from whom "significant relief is sought in

115. See, e.g.., Dyack v. N. MarianaIs., 317 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003);
U.S.I. PropertiesCorp., v. MD. Const. Co., 230 F.3d 489, 499 (1st Cir. 2000).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). This historical construction of § 1332(a)(1)
provided an additional basis to the Eleventh Amendment that blocked federal

jurisdiction over lawsuits brought against states. Eleventh Amendment issues
triggered by CAFA are briefly discussed above in this section of the article.
However, it is worth noting that Wisc. Dept. of Corrs. v. Schact, 524 U.S. 381,
389 (1998), explained that a federal court may ignore the Eleventh

Amendment until a state asserts it.
117. CAFA eliminates the requirement
presence in a class action should not
However, that only partially answers
jurisdictional exceptions in § 1332(d)(4)

of complete diversity so a state's
destroy jurisdiction under CAFA.
the question in light of CAFA's
directed at significant and target

defendants who are citizens of the forum state.
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 2005).
119. Compare the text of§ 1332(a)(1) with § 1332 (d)(2)(A).

120. Frazier, 455 F.3d at 547. The Frazier court reached its conclusion to
avoid "confusion and inconsistency." Frazier,also based its holding on CAFA's
legislative history.
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(A) (emphasis added).
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another." 2' Thus, it would seem that a "primary defendant" must
be someone, or something, different than a party from whom
significant relief is sought. Otherwise, the use of the term
"primary defendants" in § 1332(d)(4)(B) would be rendered
redundant by § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)'s reference to significant
defendants.
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report explained that
"primary defendants" are those "that would be expected to incur
most of the loss if liability is found" and would normally "include
any person who has substantial exposure to significant portions of
the proposed class in the action." 23 Accordingly, it would appear
that the governmental entity or official must be a "target
defendant" for a large majority of the putative class members in
order for this jurisdictional exemption to have any meaning.
However, in Hangarterv. The Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.,"2 a
district court concluded that a state insurance commissioner was a
"primary defendant" even though he was not named in seven of
the eight counts of a class-action complaint, and no monetary relief
was sought against him. 25 Since the commissioner was the only
defendant against whom mandamus relief was sought, through
which the insurance policies issued by the co-defendants could be
revoked or reformed, the court considered him a primary
defendant as to that claim. The court noted that the commissioner
would "bear the burden of any mandamus or quasi-mandamus
relief' which in its view was "substantial in its own light" and
could be potentially liable to the entire putative class. Thus, in
Hangarterthe state-action exemption was triggered.'26
The state-action exemption is not directed merely at
governmental entities generally, but rather at those governmental
entities against "whom the district court may be foreclosed from
ordering relief."127 The Senate Judiciary Committee Report
explains that the purpose of this exemption is to prevent
"governmental entities from dodging legitimate claims.., and
then arguing that the federal courts are constitutionally
prohibited from granting the requested relief.""
However, "a state's voluntary invocation of a federal court's
jurisdiction through removal waives a state's 'otherwise valid
objection' to litigation of a state-law claim in a federal forum. " "
122. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(aa) (requiring that at least one
defendant be a party from whom significant relief is sought), with
§ 1332(d)(4)(B) (utilizing the phrase "the primary defendants").
123. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 43, as reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 41.
124. No. C05-04558, 2006 WL 213834 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2006).
125. Id. at *2-3.

126. Id. at *3.
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(A).
128. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 42, as reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 40.
129. Osmosegbon v. Wells, 335 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting
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When that limitation on Eleventh Amendment immunity13 ° is
applied in this scenario, states and state officials may still be able
to invoke § 1332(d)'s minimal jurisdictional rules if they seek to
remove a case to federal court even when they are the "primary
defendant," because the district court would not necessarily be
foreclosed from entering relief against them under those
circumstances.
This is especially true where prospective
injunctive relief is the primary remedy sought against a state
official under the doctrine of Ex parte Young,'32 and its progeny.
Moreover, when the monetary relief is sought merely to remedy
the ongoing effects of a continuing constitutional violation,
sovereign immunity would not bar such relief irrespective of
whether the action is filed in state or federal court."n Additionally,
"municipalities, unlike States, d[o] not enjoy a constitutionally
protected immunity from suit."". Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly refused to extend the defense of sovereign
immunity to counties."5 Accordingly, the state-action exception
would not be applicable in many instances even when the
governmental entities are the primary defendants.
Section 1332(d)(5) applies where "the primary defendants" are
governmental entities. It does not apply where a governmental
entity, or where one or more governmental entities are primary
defendants.'36 This exception requires that all of the target
defendants be governmental entities.
Where one or more target
defendants are governmental entities and others are not, this
exemption should not be triggered. Such an interpretation of
§ 1332(d)(5) is consistent with the Committee Report, which
explained that plaintiffs "should not be permitted to name state
entities as defendants as a mechanism to avoid federal jurisdiction

Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 623-34 (2002)).
130. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 623-34.
131. See Frazier v. Pioneer Americas LLC, 455 F.3d 542, 546 n.17 (5th Cir.
2006) (noting that the state-action exception was "first outlined in the original
1999 version of CAFA" approximately three years before the Supreme Court
announced its decision in Lapides, and concluding "§1332(d)(5)(A) may be an
obviated response to an eliminated problem"). Frazier also recognized that
under CAFA "a state may find itself in a case removed to federal court without
having joined in the removal. Such a state, having taken no affirmative
action, has not waived immunity and can still assert it." 455 F.3d at 547.
132. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
133. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986).
134. Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 465 (2003).
135. Lake County Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S.
391, 401 n.19 (1979).
136. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5) (Supp. 2005).
137. Frazier, 455 F.3d at 546 ("The plain text of § 1332(d)(5)(A) using the
definite article before plural nouns, requires that all primary defendants be
states. Had Congress desired the opposite, it would have used 'a' and the
singular or no article.").
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over class actions that largely target non-governmental
defendants."3 '
Applying the same logic, § 1332(d)(5)'s exemption should not
bar removing the action to federal court unless it appears from the
face of a pleading that a common-law defense or immunity would
bar the action against all the named governmental defendants, in
which case the action should probably have not been brought
against them in the first place. The fact that a common-law
defense or immunity might preclude relief from being entered
against one (but not all) of the governmental defendants should
not suffice.
While the Fifth Circuit views § 1332(d)(5) as a jurisdictional
exception," 9 the Ninth Circuit recently disagreed and concluded
that it should be treated as a prerequisite to jurisdiction under
CAFA. 4 ° The Ninth Circuit based its conclusion on the language
of § 1332(d)(5) which provides "that 'paragraphs (2) through (4)
shall not apply' to any class action" in which the primary
defendants are States or State officials or where the total number
of members of all proposed plaintiff classes is less than 100.'41
This distinction is important since it impacts which party bears
the burden of proof on the issue.
B. Small Class Actions
Section 1332(d)'s diversity rules do not apply to class actions
where the total number of class members for all proposed plaintiff
classes is less than 100.12 The Senate Judiciary Committee Report
indicates that a district court "should err in favor of exercising
jurisdiction over the matter" when it is unclear whether the total
number of potential class members is less than one hundred."
C. Class Actions Involving Securities
Section 1332(d)'s diversity rules do not apply to class actions
solely involving a "security," as defined under section 16(f(3) of the
Securities Act of 1933 and section 28(f)(5)(E) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.1" State court class actions involving
"covered securities" are already subject to the SLUSA's (Securities

138. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 42, as reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 40.
139. Frazier,455 F.3d at 546.
140. Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., No. 06-17366, 2007 WL 601984 at *2, n. 2
(9th Cir., Feb. 22, 2007).
141. Id., quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5). The Ninth Circuit in Serrano also
noted that its approach, which treats § 1332(d)(5) as a prerequisite to
jurisdiction under CAFA, "is consistent with the view of the Seventh Circuit."
Id. (citing Hart, 457 F.3d at 679).
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B).
143. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 42, as reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 40.
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(A).
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Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998) mandatory preemption
and removal provisions. Thus, by this exception, Congress was
obviously attempting to draw a clear demarcation line between the
two Acts, and to leave SLUSA's jurisdictional
boundary lines for
1 45
nationally traded securities undisturbed.
D. Class Actions Directed at Internal CorporateAffairs
Section 1332(d)'s diversity rules do not apply to class actions
solely involving "the internal affairs or governance of a
corporation," or some other form of "business enterprise and that
arises under or by virtue of the laws of the State in which such
corporation or business enterprise is incorporated or organized.""
The Senate Committee Report indicates that this exception is
directed at the "internal affairs doctrine" which was described by
the Supreme Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp.1 7 as "'matters peculiar
to the relationships among or between the corporation and its
current officers, directors and shareholders.'""
The internal affairs doctrine essentially "is a conflict of laws
principle which recognizes that only one State should have the
authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs... because
otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting
demands."' 9 Section 309 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts
of Law addresses the internal affairs doctrine and specifies that
"[t]he local law of the State of incorporation will be applied to
determine the existence and extent of a director's or officer's
liability to the corporation, its creditors and shareholders." 5 °
The Senate Committee Report cited several other decisions
including McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis,' in an attempt to explain the
parameters of this exception.
In McDermott, the Delaware
Supreme Court indicated that when dealing with the internal
affairs doctrine:
145. See Estate of Pew v. Cardrelli,No 5: 05-CV-1317, 2006 WL 3524488, at
*6 n.9 (N.D.N.Y., Dec. 6, 2007) ("The effect of Section 1332(d)(9)(A) is to

prevent CAFA from disturbing impact of SLUSA on state and federal law
affecting nationally traded securities.").
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(B).
147. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
148. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 45, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 43
(quoting Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645).
149. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645.
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 309 (1971); see also
Estate of Pew, 2006 WL 3524488, at *6 (explaining "the law of the state of
incorporation normally determines issues relating to the internal affairs of a
corporation. The rule meets 'the need for certainty and predictability of result
while generally protecting the justified expectations of parties with interests

in the corporation.'" (quoting First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio,
462 U.S. 611, 621 (1983))).
151. 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987).
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It is essential to distinguish between acts which can be performed
by both corporations and individuals and those activities which are
peculiar to the corporate entity. Corporations and individuals alike
enter into contracts, commit torts, and deal in personal and real
property .... The internal affairs doctrine has no applicability in
these situations. Rather, the doctrine governs the choice of law
determinations involving..,
those activities concerning the
relationships inter se of the corporation, its directors, officers and

shareholders. 152
Another of the cited decisions in the Senate Committee
Report, Ellis v. Mutual Life Insurance Co.," explained: "[Wihere
the act complained of affects the complainant solely in his capacity
as a member of the corporation.., and is the act of the
corporation.., then such action is the management of the internal
affairs of the corporation."
Against that backdrop, a class action involving allegations of
a breach of fiduciary brought on behalf of the holders of limited
partnership units against the general partners over a proposed
sale of the partnership's assets, fell within CAFA's internal
corporate affairs exception. 5 ' The case, therefore, was remanded
to state court. 56 There is an obvious overlap between several of
CAFA's exceptions found in § 1332(d)(9).
As this decision
demonstrates, the exception for claims involving the internal
affairs or governance of a corporation is broad enough to
encompass a breach of fiduciary duty claim involving a security."7
In an attempt to clarify the respective parameters of
§ 1332(d)(9)'s exceptions, one district court explained, "[a] wide
variety of claims relating to corporate internal affairs or
governance do not require that a fiduciary duty be established.
Those claims, if governed by the law of the state of incorporation,
are covered by [the exception for internal corporate affairs]."" If a
class action claim relates to, is triggered by, or arises pursuant to
a "security," then the claim is governed by the fiduciary duty
exception freeing that "particular subset of claims from ... [the]
requirement that they be based on the laws of the state of
incorporation.""'

152. Id. at 214-15.
153. 187 So. 434 (Ala. 1939).
154. Id. at 443.
155. In re Textainer P'ship Sec. Litig., No. C 05-0969 MMC, 2005 WL
1791559, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal., July 7, 2005).
156. Id.
157. Carmona v. Bryant, No. CV-06-78-S-BLQ, 2006 WL 1043987, at *3 (D.
Idaho Apr. 19, 2006).
158. Id. at *3.
159. Id. at *2.
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E. Class Actions Relating to the Rights, Duties
or ObligationsAssociated with a Security
CAFA does not apply to class actions solely involving a right,
duty, or obligation, including a fiduciary duty "relating to or
created by or pursuant to any security" as defined in section
2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933.160 The Securities Act of 1933
defines a security to include an "investment contract" and limited
161
partnerships ordinarily qualifying as an investment contract.
However, whether a particular investment qualifies as an
investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act must be
determined on a case-by-case basis under the test set forth by the
Supreme Court in Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. W. J.
Howey Co. 62 Following Howey, an investment qualifies as an
investment contract - and is treated as a security - whenever it
involves an investment of income in a common enterprise and an
expectation of profits solely from the efforts of others." Thus, this
exception is broader than what might appear at first blush.
For example, this exception was held to have been triggered
in a class action brought on behalf of limited partnership owners
that challenged a proposed sale of the partnership's assets. The
complaint alleged that the sale, negotiated by the general
partners, was fundamentally unfair because it was the product of
a flawed bidding process with undervalued assets and misleading
proxy statements. The district court held those allegations fell
within the coverage of § 1332(d)(9)(C)'s jurisdictional exception.
This exception was also found applicable to a shareholder class
action where the class members sought equitable relief alleging
breach of fiduciary duties and self-dealing in connection with a
corporate merger. In that decision, the district court concluded
those allegations also fell within the exception, resulting in a
remand to state court.16
Section 1332(d)(9)(C) encompasses not only the rights, duties
and obligations conferred by the terms of a security itself such as
"voting rights, rights to receive dividends, rights upon liquidation
or any other claim arising from.., ownership" of a security, but
also any "rights, duties and obligations that are connected with
the security."165 As one district noted:
Subdivision (d)(9) of Section 1332 carves out a substantial exception
for state law securities and business-related claims .... The three
160. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(C) (Supp. 2005).
161. Textainer, 2005 WL 1791559, at *6 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2000)).
162. 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).

163. Id.
164. Ind. State Dist. Counsel of Laborers and Hod Carriers Pension Fund v.
Renal Group, Inc., No. Civ. 3:05-0451, 2005 WL 2000658, at *1 (M.D. Tenn.

Aug. 18, 2005).
165. Estate of Pew, 2006 WL 3524488, at *5.
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subparagraphs of subdivision (d)(9), read together, evince an overall
legislative intention to maintain federal protection of 'the integrity
and efficient operation' of the market for nationally traded
securities, while preserving the significant role played by states in
the regulation of business entities and securities that are not
nationally traded.16
To state the obvious, the three exceptions set forth in
above, do not close CAFA's door to the
federal courthouse where a class action complaint raises multiple
liability issues or involves claims or theories other than one of
those specifically exempted by § 1332(d)(9).

§ 1332(d)(9), discussed

IV. PERMISSIBLE AND MANDATORY GROUNDS TO DECLINE DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION: THE ONE-THIRD AND TWO-THIRD RULES

While § 1332(d)(2) may open the door to federal diversity
jurisdiction for many class actions, §§ 1332(d)(3) and (4) provide a
means to close that door. Section 1332(d)(3) grants district courts
with a discretionary basis to decline the exercise of diversity
jurisdiction over a class action. Where the factors enumerated by
§ 1332(d)(4) are met, the district court is required to decline
jurisdiction. However, where one-third or less of all putative class
members reside in the forum state, the exceptions to class action
diversity jurisdiction discussed below are not triggered. When
raising these exceptions, the party seeking remand bears the
burden of proving the number of putative class members who are
citizens of the forum state.'67 If the party seeking remand fails to
meet that burden, a motion to remand based on these exceptions
should be denied.'6
A. Discretionary Ground to Decline Jurisdiction:The
Greaterthan One-Third But Less than Two-Thirds Rule
Section 1332(d)(3) provides that "in the interests of justice
and looking at the totality of the circumstances" a court may
decline to exercise jurisdiction "over a class action in which greater
than one-third but less than two-thirds of the members of all
proposed plaintiff classes," and "the primary defendants are
citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed ....169
Factors that a district court has to consider in making this
determination include:

166. Id. at *6 (internal citations omitted).
167. See, e.g., Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1164-65 (11th Cir.
2006).
168. Id. at 1168.
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3) (Supp. 2005).
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(A) whether the claims asserted involve matters of national or
state interest;
(B) whether the claims asserted will be governed by the laws of
the State in which the action was originally filed or by the
laws of other States;
(C) whether the class action was pleaded in a manner that
seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction;
(D) whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct
nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or the
defendants;
(E) whether the number of citizens of the State in which the
action was originally filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in
the aggregate is substantially larger than the number of
citizens from any other State, and the citizenship of the
other members of the proposed class is dispersed among a
substantial number of States; and
(F) whether, during the 3-year period preceding the filing of
that class action, 1 or more other class actions asserting the
same or similar claims, on behalf of the same or other
persons have been filed.17°
Sections 1332(d)(3)'s use of the phrase "the primary
defendants" again requires that all of the target defendants be
citizens of the forum state."'
If one or more of the target
defendants are citizens of a different state, then this exception
should not apply. Additionally, in the Fifth Circuit's view, if one of
the primary or target defendants is a state agency or the state
itself, then neither this exception nor the "home state" or "local
controversy" exceptions can be successfully invoked because of the
historical rule that a state has no citizenship for diversity
purposes. 7'
The definition of a proposed class will have a major impact on
CAFA's one-third and two-third rules, setting the stage for the
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)(A)-(F).
171. See Frazier, 455 F.3d at 546 (addressing § 1332(d)(5)(A)'s exception
where "the primary defendants are States," and concluding that all primary
defendants must be States to invoke that exception).
172. Id. at 547 (citing Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 87 (1982)) Frazier
observed that CAFA "does not alter the current law" concerning the
determination of citizenship. Id. However, see notes 114-20 and
accompanying text for a discussion of CAFA's impact on the historical rule
that a state was not deemed to be a citizen for diversity purposes and the
Frazierdecision.
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district court's required analysis. Where a plaintiffs proposed
class definition does not refer to the citizenship or domicile of the
putative class members, CAFA's one-third and two-third
exceptions should not be triggered.' The plaintiffs proposed class
definition will likely be the focus of heated jurisdictional disputes.
Class counsel seeking to dodge federal court jurisdiction will fashion
proposed class definitions in an effort to maximize the number of instate class members.
Another contentious litigation issue is whether class counsel
can attempt to trigger this exception by intentionally not naming a
primary defendant from a different state. New jurisdictional
battles implicating the potential joinder of necessary parties under
Rule 19 loom on the horizon. 74 Therefore, an issue that will have
to be resolved is whether a defendant can be a "necessary party"
under Rule 19, because in its absence, complete relief could not be
afforded, and if so, still not be a "primary defendant" under the
Act?
B. Mandatory Grounds to Decline Jurisdiction- The 'HomeState" and "Local Controversy"Exceptions - The Two-Thirds or
More Rules
Section 1332(d)(4) sets forth two alternative tests that require
a court to decline diversity jurisdiction over a class action where
two-thirds or more of all proposed plaintiff class members are
citizens of the forum state. The first is where "two-thirds of the
potential class members and the primary defendants" are citizens
of the state in which the action is filed."' This has been referred to
as the "home state controversy" exception. 76
The second is where (1) more than two-thirds of all proposed
plaintiff class members and at least one "significant defendant"
are citizens of the forum state, (2) the principal injuries caused by
173. See, e.g., Adams v. Fed. Materials Co., Inc., No. Civ.A. 5:05CV-90-R,
2005 WL 1862378, at *5 (W.D. Ky. July 28, 2005) (recognizing that where
plaintiffs defined the class as "all other similarly situated owners of structures
in the Princeton, Kentucky area," the court determined that those owners were
not necessarily Kentucky citizens); Schwartz H, 2006 WL 487915, at *5-6 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 28, 2006) (holding that plaintiffs' proposed class definition of "[aill
persons and entities residing or doing business in... Pennsylvania" did not
trigger these exceptions because a person's residence is not the same as his or
her domicile or citizenship).
174. Cf. Mattera v. Clear Channel Commc'n, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 01878 (DC),
2006 WL 3290836, at *2-6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2006) (dismissing a putative
class action for the failure to join an indispensable party where joinder would
destroy complete diversity and because there was no basis for jurisdiction

under CAFA).
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B) (emphasis added).
176. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Comcast Corp. (Schwartz I,) No. Civ.A. 05-2340,
2005 WL 1799414, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2005) (explaining the alternative

two-thirds test).
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"each defendant" were incurred in the state in which the action
was originally filed, and (3) during the immediately preceding
three-year period, no other class actions involving the same or
similar allegations were brought against any of the defendants.177
Under this second test, a significant defendant is one from whom
"significant relief is sought," and whose conduct "forms a
significant basis for the claims asserted" by the proposed plaintiff
class.'78 This has been referred to as the "local controversy"
exception.'79
The Eleventh Circuit relied upon the Senate
Committee Report in reaching its conclusion that the local
controversy exception was narrowly drafted "to ensure that it does
not become a jurisdictional loophole," and that all doubts should be
resolved "in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the case.""s
Under these alternative tests, the terms "the primary
defendants," and "at least 1 defendant is a defendant from whom
significant relief is sought" are treated differently, and counsel
should resist any attempt to merge the two concepts. 8 ' The Act
does not define what constitutes "significant relief' or what
amounts to a "significant basis for the claims asserted." In light of
traditional rules on joint and several liability, theoretically any
defendant could qualify as one from whom significant relief is
sought. However, the Eleventh Circuit has rejected the notion
that the local controversy exception can be met merely through
allegations of joint and several liability.182 As the court explained,
"the mere fact that relief might be sought against [one defendant]
for the conduct of others (via joint liability) does not convert the
conduct of others into [the] conduct of [that defendant] so as to also
satisfy the 'significant basis' requirement.""
Whether a defendant's alleged conduct forms a significant
basis for the claim asserted could also turn on the legal theory
under which the action is being brought. It is unclear whether
traditional state law concepts such as active versus passive fault,
or direct versus vicarious liability will play any role or impact a
177. See Caruso v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 06-2613, 2007 WL 64162, at *5 (E.D.
La., Jan. 8, 2007) (noting that several other proposed class actions involving
similar factual allegations had been filed against several of the named

defendants during the prior three year period and concluding the existence of
those other class actions was fatal to plaintiffs' argument that the action

should be remanded pursuant to CAFA's local controversy exception).
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A).
179. Schwartz I, 2005 WL 1799414, at *2.
180. Evans, 449 F.3d at 1164 (quoting S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 39, 42, as
reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 38, 40).
181. See Caruso, 2007 WL 64162, at *4 ("Clearly, CAFA intended there to be

a substantive difference between 'primary defendants' and 'significant
defendants'

as contemplated by the two exceptions to the exercise of

jurisdiction under the statute.").
182. Id. at 1167 n.7.
183. Id.
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court's analysis when addressing this issue. However, in Adams v.
Federal Materials Co., one district court concluded that where a
complaint sought the same relief from all defendants, the fact that
one defendant might be liable to another under an indemnification
theory did not provide a basis for treating one as a "secondary"
defendant for purposes of § 1332(d)(4)(B).'"
85
In Robinson v. Cheetah Transportation,'
the driver of a
tractor-trailer was not deemed a defendant from whom significant
relief was sought. In reaching that conclusion, the court in
Robinson observed under the local controversy exception, whether
"significant relief' is sought from an in-state defendant requires
"not only an assessment of how many members of the class were
harmed by the defendant's actions, but also a comparison of the
relief sought between all defendants and each defendant's ability
to pay a potential judgment."'86 The Robinson court recognized
that "[w]ith an amount in controversy of at least $5,000,000, the
plaintiffs will seek most of that relief from those who are capable
of paying it: the corporate defendants.""7 An additional factor
indicating that plaintiffs were not seeking "significant relief' from
the driver was their failure to serve him as of the date of the
court's ruling."s When the amount of the relief sought from an instate defendant is relatively minor in comparison to the amount of
the total relief sought in the action, then the local controversy
exception would be inapplicable.
The Eleventh Circuit recently endorsed Robinson's
approach'89 in a matter that involved both personal injury and
property damage claims based upon allegations involving the
release of toxic waste substances from the' defendants'
manufacturing facilities. 9 ' Critical to the outcome however, was
plaintiffs' failure to offer any insight as to the role which the
forum-state defendant played in the alleged contamination, or the
184. Adams, 2005 WL 1862378, at *5-6. Contrast Adams with Serrano v.
180 Connect, Inc., No. C 06-1363 TEH, 2006 WL 2348888, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 11, 2006) (holding that primary defendants "include 'all defendants
facing direct liability, and exclud[e] all defendants joined as secondary or

third-party defendants for purposes of vicarious liability, indemnification or
contribution'" (quoting Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 43, 62 (D.R.I.
2004))).
185. No. Civ.A. 06-0005, 2006 WL 468820 (W.D. La. Feb. 27, 2006).
186. Id. at *3. See also In re Ingram Barge Co., No. 05-4419, 2007 WL
148647, at *2 (E.D. La., Jan. 10, 2007) (denying a motion to remand, holding
the individuals working for the corporate defendant were not primary
defendants, their employer was the primary defendant because it was "the
party that well and is most able to bear most of the liability if the plaintiffs
prevail").

187.
188.
189.
190.

Robinson, 2006 WL 468820, at *4.
Id.
Evans, 449 F.3d at 1167.
Id. at 1161.
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number or percentage of putative class members who may have
claims against that defendant.'91 The Eleventh Circuit also pointed
to the fact that the defendant had closed one of its plants in 1951,
and that its other plant was not located near the largest
concentration of the identified class members. On the other hand,
a number of other defendants had operations much closer to the
affected area." These factors suggested that the conduct of the
forum-state defendant was not significant when compared to the
other defendants, and would not form a significant basis for the
class members' claims.9
Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to
establish the applicability of the local controversy exception and
removal was proper under CAFA.
Because the determination of whether significant relief is
being sought from a forum-state defendant involves a
determination of the number of putative class members who were
potentially harmed by that defendant and a comparison of the
relief sought from all defendants, market share information, if
available for the specific state could prove to be determinative on
the issue.'94
Note that under § 1332(d)(4)'s home-state controversy
exception, all target defendants must be from the forum state.
Under the local controversy exception, only one significant
defendant must be from that state.
The local controversy
exception also states that the principal injuries from each of the
defendant's misconduct must have been incurred (not occurred) in
the state in which the action was filed. 9' The term "principal
injuries" is not defined, and in many scenarios, what constitutes
the principal injury may be far from clear. In a ground-water
contamination case, for example, which allegedly results in
physical illness or injuries to multiple persons, is the principal
injury the contamination of the ground water or the subsequent
physical illness? Where multiple parties are suing to recover for
monetary losses or lost profits, will the size of an individual's loss
or the number of plaintiffs in a given state be the determinative
factor for assessing the state in which the principal injuries were
191. Id. at 1167.
192. Id. at 1168.
193. Id.
194. Compare Gauntt v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., No. 06-7817, 2007 WL
128801, at *2 (E.D. La., Jan. 16, 2007), with Caruso, 2007 WL 64162, at *4. In
both cases, market share information was critical to the outcome and led two

district courts to markedly different conclusions.
195. See Mattera, 2006 WL 3290836, at *11 (observing that the local
controversy exception "does not apply to cases in which the defendants
engaged in conduct that 'could be alleged to have injured [persons] throughout
the country or broadly throughout several states.'" (quoting Kearns v. Ford
Motor Co., No. 05 Civ. 5644, 2005 WL 3967998, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21,

2005))).
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incurred? As with several of CAFA's other class action diversity
rules, until guidance is provided by the courts, these issues have to
be carefully addressed by counsel. The one-third and two-third
rules create some room to play for a creative pleader that desires
to dodge federal court jurisdiction.
For purposes of the one-third and two-third rules, the
existence of other class actions involving the same or similar
allegations would seemingly favor the assertion of federal
jurisdiction, especially in view of the "multidistrict litigation
process" in which all of the proposed actions "could be handled
efficiently on a coordinated basis.""
The Senate Committee
Report explains that this factor should be liberally interpreted so
that "plaintiffs [are] not ... able to plead around it with creative
legal theories."'97 In other words, where the subject matter of a
prior class action is the same, a party should not be able to trigger
§ 1332(d)(4)'s jurisdictional exemption merely by changing legal
theories.
Finally, it has been suggested that one strategy that may be
employed to avoid CAFA is the filing of coordinated state-wide
class actions to take advantage of §§ 1332(d)(3) and (d)(4)'s
jurisdictional exceptions. However, both sections 1332(d)(3)(F)
and (d)(4)(A)(ii) can be used to negate those exceptions where a
similar class action had been filed during the prior three-year
period "on behalf of the same or other persons."'98 Once the first
state-wide class action is filed, any subsequent class action filed in
another state asserting a similar liability theory should be swept
up by subparagrapshs (d)(3)(F) and (d)(4)(A)(ii). The use of the
phrase "or other persons" in those provisions make them broad
enough to encompass any subsequent, similar state-wide class
action, and should be able to at least partially blunt such a
strategy.
V. POST-REMOVAL JURISDICTIoNAL DISCOVERY
The Senate Committee Report recognized that in some
instances "a federal court may have to engage in some fact-finding,
not unlike what is necessitated by existing jurisdictional
statutes."" The Report explained that "limited discovery may be
necessary to make these determinations," but further clarified that
"these jurisdictional determinations should be made largely on the
basis of readily available information."2" The Report further
cautioned that:

196. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 38, as reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 36.
197. Id., as reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,37.
198. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(3)(F)-(d)(4)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
199. Id., as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,42.

200. Id.
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Allowing substantial, burdensome discovery on jurisdictional issues
would be contrary to the intent of these provisions to encourage the
exercise of federal jurisdiction over class actions. For example, in
assessing the citizenship of the various members of a proposed class,
it would in most cases be improper for the named plaintiffs to
request that the defendant produce a list of all class members (or
detailed information that would allow the construction of such a
list), in many instances a massive, burdensome undertaking that
will not be necessary unless a proposed class is certified. Less
burdensome means (e.g., factual stipulations) should be used in
creating a record upon which the jurisdictional determinations can
be made. 20'
The Ninth Circuit recognized that in light of the aforementioned
legislative history, "any decision regarding jurisdictional discovery
is a discretionary one, and is governed by existing principles
regarding post-removal jurisdictional discovery, including the
disinclination to entertain substantial, burdensome discovery on
jurisdictional issues."02
VI. REVISIONS To REMOVAL PROCEDURE
Defendants are permitted to remove state court actions that
could have been originally filed in federal court.0 3 Historically,
under federal removal statutes "[the scales are not evenly
balanced ....

An

in-state

plaintiff

may

invoke

diversity

jurisdiction, but § 1441(b) bars removal on the basis of diversity "if
any 'part[y] in interest properly joined and served as [a]
defendan[t] is a citizen of the State in which [the] action is
brought.' ' °
CAFA's expansion of diversity jurisdiction enhances the
ability to remove qualifying class actions to federal court.
However, there currently exists a complex network of rules
The law of removal has been
regulating removal practice.
described as "a minefield through which unwary litigants pass at
their peril."0 5 Congress addressed the complexity of removal
201. Id.; see also Schwartz II, 2006 WL 487915, at *4 (expressing caution
over the use of this legislative history in denying plaintiffs motion for a
remand, the district court based its jurisdictional determination upon
information "available at this stage of the litigation"); Abrego, 443 F.3d at 684

(concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order
post-removal jurisdictional discovery).
202. Abrego, 443 F.3d at 684.
203. See City of Chi. v. Int'l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997);
Jefferson County, Ala. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 430 (1999) ("It is the general

rule that an action may be removed from state court to federal court only if a
federal district court would have original jurisdiction over the claim in suit.").
204. Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 88 (2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b) (2000)) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
205. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT, REPORTER'S SUMMARY:
PART III REMOVAL: PROPOSED REVISION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1441-1447, A.L.I.
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practice in CAFA by eliminating three traditional hurdles to
removal for qualifying class actions and by providing an
accelerated appellate review of remand orders.2"
CAFA's changes to removal practice were directly linked to its
revisions of diversity jurisdiction. Section 1453(a) provides that
"the terms 'class,' 'class action,' 'class certification order,' and 'class
member' shall have the same meanings given [those] terms under
section 1332(d)( 1). " 27 Additionally, CAFA's jurisdictional exceptions applicable to claims solely involving "covered securities," the
internal affairs of a corporation, and the rights, duties, and
obligations created by a security, are also found in CAFA's
removal provisions. 211
Section 1441(a) governs removal of claims where a federal
court's jurisdiction is based upon diversity jurisdiction. Section
1441(b) authorizes removal of actions involving a federal question
(claims based upon the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States). Removal of suits against foreign states is also
permitted under § 1441(d). CAFA does not affect removal based
upon federal question jurisdiction or removal of a suit involving a
foreign state. CAFA does however provide an alternative basis to
remove a class action when a foreign state or citizen or subject of a
foreign state is either a putative class member or a named
defendant in the class action.2°
A. One-Year Limitation on Removal Eliminated for Class Actions
Section 1446(b) recognizes that federal jurisdiction may not
be triggered by the initial pleading filed in state court. It can arise
through "an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper," and
§ 1446(b) permits a party to file a notice of removal within thirty

(2004), as reprinted in 19A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE app., at 627 (2005). For example, a plaintiff may not remove an
action to federal court after a counterclaim is filed despite the plaintiffs new
status as a counter-defendant. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S.
100, 106 (1941). CAFA does not change that result. See, e.g., Unifund CCR
Partners v. Wallis, No. Civ.A. 06-CV-545-GRA, 2006 WL 908755 (D.S.C. Apr.
7, 2006).
206. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (permitting a district court, when
remanding a case, to impose costs and attorney fees where appropriate), with
Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 125 S.Ct. 704, 711 (2005)
("Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney's fees under §
1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis
for seeking removal. Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis exists,
fees should be denied.").
207. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(a) (Supp. 2005).
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(A)-(C) (Supp. 2005); 28 U.S.C. § 1453(d)(1)-(3)
(Supp. 2005).
209. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(B)-(C).
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days after receipt thereof.1 Section 1446(b), however, contains its
own limitations period: "No case... may be removed from state to
federal court based on diversity of citizenship 'more than 1 year
CAFA eliminates
after commencement of the action.'"2'
§ 1446(b)'s one year limitation for removal of class actions."'
B. Removal by Defendants who are Citizens of the Forum State
One of the historical supports for diversity jurisdiction was
"the reassurance of fairness and competence that a federal court
can supply to an out-of-state defendant facing suit in state
court."' That concern is lessened where one of the defendants is a
resident of the state in which the action was brought. Section
1446(b)'s text reflects that distinction: if diversity provides the
basis for federal court jurisdiction, a case cannot be removed
where one of the defendants is a citizen of the state in which the
action is brought." CAFA also eliminates that prohibition against
removal for class actions encompassed by the Act."'
C. Consent of All Defendants Not Required
Traditionally, where a claim is brought against multiple
defendants, they are treated collectively for removal purposes. All
defendants who have been served must either join in or indicate
their consent to removal."' A removal petition is defective where
it fails to demonstrate that all properly served parties have either
joined or consented to removal." 7 CAFA eliminates that hurdle to
removal."' Section 1453(b) provides that a class action "may be
removed by any defendant without the consent of all
defendants."" 9

210. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000).
211. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 69 (1996) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b)).
212. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b); Braud, 445 F.3d at 806 (holding a newly added
defendant can remove under CAFA even when the case had been pending in
state court for over a year).
213. Davis v. Carl Cannon Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 182 F.3d 792, 797 (11th Cir.
1999).
214. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
215. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) ("A class action may be removed to a district
court... without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the State in
which the action is brought.").
216. See, e.g., Phoenix Container, L.P. v. Sokoloff, 235 F.3d 352, 353-54 (7th

Cir. 2000) (noting "an essential step" to removal is all defendants joining in
the petition to remove).
217. Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 368-69 (7th Cir. 1993).
218. See Adams, 2005 WL 1862378, at *4.
219. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b).
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D. Burden of Proof When Remand is Sought
A court will "resolve all contested issues of substantive fact in
favor of the plaintiff,"22 and a case will be remanded "if there is
doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." 21 When a
motion to remand is filed, historically the party invoking federal
jurisdiction through removal bears the burden of demonstrating
both the existence of federal jurisdiction and that the procedural
requirements for removal have been met.222
These principles
spring from the Supreme Court's holding in Shamrock Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Sheets, calling for strict construction of the law of removal
based upon "successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction
2
of federal courts.""
However, the Court subsequently recognized
in Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard 4 that "whatever apparent
force this argument might have claimed when Shamrock was
handed down has been qualified by later statutory development."
Nonetheless, strict construction of removal under CAFA based
upon the holding of Shamrock still apparently holds force."'
The Senate Committee Report indicates that after a case has
been removed to federal court under CAFA "the named plaintiff(s)
should bear the burden of demonstrating that a case should be
remanded to state court."22 However, CAFA itself is silent on this
point; its statutory text does not specifically address the issue.
Thus, in light of CAFA's statutory silence, it is unclear which
party bears the burden of proof when remand is sought: the
defendant who removed the case, or the plaintiff seeking remand?
District courts addressing this issue have reached conflicting
results, splitting over the use of CAFA's legislative history. One
group, following the lead of Berry v. American Express Publishing
Corp.,227 has concluded that CAFA shifts the burden of proof to the
party seeking remand.22
220. Boyer v. Snap On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990).
221. Jones v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 541 F.2d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 1976).
222. Doe v. Allied Signal, 985 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1993); Shamrock Oil,
313 U.S. at 108-09.
223. Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 108.
224. 538 U.S. at 697.
225. See, e.g., Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1328-29 (11th Cir.

2006) ("The rule of construing removal statutes strictly and resolving doubts
in favor of remands however, is well-established."); In re Audi Litigation, 2006
WL 1543752, at *1 n.3 ("It might be argued that the presumption in favor of
the states no longer applies after CAFA. Courts deciding removal cases postCAFA, however, have continued to reaffirm the traditional proposition that
doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand.").
226. S.REP. No. 109-14, at 43, as reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3.
227. 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
228. See, e.g., Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 161, 168 (D. Mass.
2005), affd on other grounds, 424 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Judy v.
Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:05CV1208RWS, 2005 WL 2240088, at *1-2 (E.D. Mo. Sept.
14, 2005); Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-768-BR, 2005 WL
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In determining that the Senate Committee Report could be
used to decipher legislative intent, the district court in Berry
observed that "where the statute does not squarely address [an]
issue, legislative history is an essential tool for statutory
Significant to its conclusion was that the
interpretation."m
original diversity statute, just like CAFA, does not contain any
reference to the burden of proof issue. "To this end, Committee
Reports are 'the authoritative source for finding the Legislature's
intent,' and may be consulted as one important resource in the
quest for faithful statutory interpretation."230
On the other side of the issue, several district courts have
observed that Congress is presumed to be aware of existing
precedent when it enacts a new law. Although Congress changed
several aspects of existing removal practice in CAFA, it did not
Therefore, those courts
address the burden of proof issue.
concluded that if Congress had intended to change which party
bore the burden of proof on removal, it would have addressed the
issue in CAFA's statutory text. Congress' failure to do so, in those
courts' view, does not render CAFA's removal provisions
ambiguous so as to warrant the use of legislative history." 1
Given the Federal Judicial Code Revision Project's
acknowledgement of the complexity of removal practice, it is
unrealistic to expect that Congress could address every specific
issue found in the decisional law. However, the Seventh Circuit,
in an opinion written by Judge Easterbrook, forcefully rejected the
notion that Congress changed the burden of proof on removal
under CAFA. In explaining that "naked legislative history has no
legal effect," he explained:
When a law sensibly could be read in multiple ways, legislative
history may help a court understand which of these received the
political branches' imprimatur. But when the legislative history
stands by itself, as a naked expression of "intent" unconnected to
any enacted text, it has no more force than an opinion poll of
legislators - less, really, as it speaks for fewer.232
Every other federal circuit that has addressed the issue reached
the same conclusion.' While the Seventh Circuit recognized "that
2211094, at *1 (D. Or. Sept. 8, 2005); Harvey, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 752;
Textainer, 2005 WL 1791559, at *2-3; Waitt v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. C05-

0759L, 2005 WL 1799740, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2005).
229. Berry, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1121.
230. Id. (quoting Garcia v. U.S., 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984)).

231. See, e.g., Plummer v. Farmers Group, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 131718 (E.D. Okla. 2005); Judy, 2005 WL 2240088, at *1-2; Schwartz 1, 2005 WL

1799414 at *6-7; Sneddon v. Hotwire, Inc., No. C 05-0951 SI, 2005 WL
1593593, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2005); In re Expedia Hotel Taxes and Fees
Litigation, 377 F. Supp. 2d 904, 905 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
232. Brill, 427 F.3d at 448.
233. Abrego, 443 F.3d at 684-85 (discussing several of CAFA's provisions
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a dozen or so district judges" had reached a contrary conclusion, 34
practitioners in the Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits should take care before suggesting that CAFA changed
which party bears the initial burden of proof on removal.
Attorneys practicing outside those circuits who would
continue to press the issue, should consider citing decisions such
as Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,"5 where the Court addressed
which party bore the burden of proof under the Equal Pay Act, and
236
Grogan v. Garner, addressing which party bore the burden of
proof under § 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code in light of the Code's
silence on the issue. In Corning Glass, the Court held that
"[a]lthough the [Equal Pay] Act is silent on this point, its
legislative history makes plain that the Secretary has the burden
of proof on this issue. " 2n Based on Corning Glass, an argument
can be constructed that in determining which party bears the
burden of proof, a court first looks at the text of the statute and
where the text is silent on the issue, legislative history can be
employed to answer the question. Similarly, in Grogan, the Court
began the "inquiry into the appropriate burden of proof under
§ 523 [of the Bankruptcy Code] by examining the language of the
statute and its legislative history."2 38 However, in Corning Glass,
the Court was working from a clean slate, whereas with CAFA,
the use of legislative history must overcome the historical rule
that the party who removes an action to federal court bears the
initial burden of establishing the propriety of federal court
Unfortunately, the legislative history of the
jurisdiction."s
Bankruptcy Code, like the Code itself, is silent on the burden of
proof issue, so the force of Grogan's suggested approach is
significantly lessened.24 9

that expand diversity jurisdiction and eliminate barriers to removal, and
concluding "that these broadening provisions indicate that Congress carefully
inserted into the legislation the changes it intended and did not mean
otherwise to alter the jurisdictional terrain"); Evans, 449 F.3d at 1164 ("We
agree with these courts that CAFA does not change the well established rule
that the removing party bears that burden of proof."); Miedema, 450 F.3d at
1328 (same); Morgan v. Gay (Morgan II), 471 F.3d 469, 473 (3d Cir. 2006) ("It
should take more than a few lines in a Senate Judiciary Committee Report
and some vague language in a statute's 'Findings and Purposes' section to
reverse the well-established proposition that the party seeking removal carries
the jurisdiction-proving burden."); Galeno, 472 F.3d at 58 (same).
234. Brill, 427 F.3d at 448.
235. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
236. 498 U.S. 279 (1991).
237. Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 195.
238. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286.
239. See Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1328 n.5 (distinguishing Corning Glass on
the basis of existing federal decisions addressing the burden of proof in
removal practice).
240. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286.
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Alternatively, in Exxon Mobil the Court held that legislative
history could not be used to contradict the terms of a statute.
Here, legislative history is not being used to contradict any
statutory provision because neither the original removal statute
nor CAFA address the issue. Rather the use of legislative history
here is consistent with the underlying purpose of the CAFA, and
filling a gap left by Congress is an approach that the Supreme
Court approved in Lamie141
Another burden of proof issue that has arisen under CAFA is
which party bears the burden of adddressing CAFA's jurisdictional
exceptions: the defendant by invoking federal jurisdiction in its
removal notice, or the plaintiff when objecting to that jurisdiction
in a motion to remand. In Breuer, the Supreme Court held "that
whenever the subject matter of an action qualifies it for removal,
the burden is on [the] plaintiff to find an express exception." 42
Based in large part upon Breuer, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that once the removing party initially demonstrates the existence
of federal jurisdiction over a class action under CAFA, the plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing that the action fits within one of
CAFA's jurisdictional exceptions to bar removal."
The Fifth
Circuit agreed with the Eleventh Circuit's rationale in reaching
the same result.' "
The Seventh Circuit subsequently addressed the issue and
concluded that the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits' analysis had
"missed an important step, namely, the examination of the
language of the statute before it." 4' However, after comparing
CAFA's jurisdictional grant in § 1332(d)(2) with its "home state"
exception in § 1332(d)(4), the Seventh Circuit concluded that "the
relation between subparts (d)(2) and (d)(4) of CAFA is analogous to
the structure of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), which the Supreme Court
examined in Breuer," and ultimately agreed with the result that
the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits reached - the party seeking
remand bears the burden of establishing one of CAFA's
jurisdictional exceptions when remand is sought based upon those
exceptions. "' Accordingly, while the party seeking removal may
continue to bear the initial burden of demonstrating removal was
proper under CAFA, once that initial jurisdictional threshold is
established, the party opposing removal bears the burden of

241. Lamie, 540 U.S. at 538.
242. Breuer, 538 U.S. at 698.
243. Evans, 449 F.3d at 1165 (holding plaintiffs bare the burden of
establishing CAFA's local controversy exception applied to their action).
244. Frazier, 455 F.3d at 546 ("ITihe district court properly placed the
burden on plaintiffs, for the reasons explained by the Eleventh Circuit.").
245. Hart,457 F.3d at 680.
246. Id. at 680-81.
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establishing the applicability of one of CAFA's jurisdictional
exceptions.
VII.

ESTABLISHING CAFA's AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY
WHEN SEEKING REMOVAL

While the Seventh Circuit has led the charge in rejecting the
argument that CAFA shifted the burden of establishing the
propriety of federal court jurisdiction to the plaintiff, it also
reaffirmed that the defense's burden is not a heavy one. It
explained that all the removing defendant must show is a
"reasonable probability" that the stakes of the litigation exceed
CAFA's aggregate jurisdictional threshold. 4 ' "Defendants seeking
removal may meet that burden by a preponderance of the
evidence."248 Once that has been demonstrated, the legal certainty
standard "comes to the fore."24 9
Under the legal certainty standard, "[o]nce the proponent of
[diversity] jurisdiction has set out the amount in controversy, only
a 'legal certainty' that the judgment will be less forecloses federal
jurisdiction."25 ° "Generally, dismissal under the legal certainty
standard will be warranted only when a contract limits the
possible recovery, when the law limits the amount recoverable, or
when there is an obvious abuse of federal court jurisdiction."25 ' In

247. Brill, 427 F.3d at 449. In Shaw, 994 F.2d at 366 n.2, the Seventh
Circuit held "that the test set forth in McNutt is satisfied if a defendant in a
removal action can show to a reasonable probability that more than $50,000 is
in controversy." However, it subsequently explained in Meridian Sec. Ins. Co.
v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 540 (7th Cir. 2006), that "Shaw's mention of
"reasonable probability that jurisdiction exists'... has been taken to mean
that uncertainty about the stakes must be resolved against the proponent of
jurisdiction. That's not what Shaw set out to establish. In retrospect, it is
clear that the turn of phrase was infelicitous. We now retract that language;
it has no role to play in determining the amount in controversy." Id. As
explained in the text above, Meridian clarified that the preponderance of the
evidence standard is the threshold that a removing defendant must meet
when jurisdictional facts are contested. Therefore, see Normand v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., Inc., 193 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 1999) ("To maintain a suit
in which the stakes must exceed some specified minimum, the plaintiff (or the
defendant, if the suit is removed) need demonstrate no more than a good faith,
minimally reasonable belief that suit might result in a judgment in excess of
that amount.").
248. Meridian, 441 F.3d at 542.
249. Id.
250. Brill, 427 F.3d at 448 (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab
Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938)); see also Meridian, 441 F.3d at 541 ("once these facts
have been established the propoennt's estimate of the claim's value must be
accepted unless there is a 'legal certainty' that the controversy's value is below
the threshold.").
251. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Society v. Manjanaro, 342 F.3d 1213,
1217 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER
& EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION
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other words, when meeting the amount in controversy is a virtual
impossibility.
Establishing CAFA's amount in controversy threshold can be
accomplished through a "common sense" reading of a complaint. 2
Where a "complaint is silent or ambiguous on one or more of the
ingredients needed to calculate the amount in controversy," the
Seventh Circuit explained that "[a] defendant's notice of removal
then serves the same function as the complaint would in a suit
filed in federal court. " "i The requisite amount in controversy can

§ 3702, at 98-101 (2d ed. 1987)).

252. See Brill, 427 F.3d at 449 (holding that "[clountrywide did all that is
necessary by admitting that one of its employees sent at least 3,800 fax ads,"
coupled with the available statutory damages that could be trebled); see also
Chase v. Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424, 427 (7th Cir.
1997) ("The starting point in determining the amount in controversy is
typically the face of the complaint."); Fiore v. First American Title Ins. Co., No.
05-CV-474-DRH, 2005 WL 3434074, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2005) (holding
CAFA's aggregate threshold was met by recognizing that where there were
8,653,141 potential members of the putative class, "if each class member's
claim averaged just $.58," CAFA's aggregate "jurisdictional threshold would be
surpassed."); Chavis v. Fidelity Warranty Services, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 2d 620,
627 (D.S.C. 2006) (recognizing that, where plaintiffs complaint alleged "the
amount in controversy can be as much as $50,000 per class member" and
plaintiff purports to represent a class having more than 100 class members, by
simply multiplying the two numbers, more than $5,000,000 was "in
controversy" and removal was proper under CAFA); Robinson, 2006 WL
468820, at *2 (observing that the court "cannot ignore the plain facts of a case
and the inferences that follow therefrom" and holding that CAFA's threshold
was met in light of "the size of the putative class," the alleged "widespread
harm" which resulted, "and the amplifying events surrounding the bridges
closure").
253. Brill, 427 F.3d at 449. Information must be provided to the court
through which the amount in controversy can be calculated. That information
must be set forth in either plaintiffs complaint or defendant's notice of
removal. For example, in a matter involving allegations of fraud stemming
from the sale of a thirty-five dollar extended warranty to the plaintiff, the fact
that there were many thousands of class members and that defendant
generated revenues or more than $50 million per fiscal year from the sale of
extended warranties did not suffice where no information was provided as to
the amount of the plaintiffs claimed damages. Holland v. Cole National
Corp., No. 7:04-CV-246, 2005 WL 1242349, at *15 (W.D. Va. May 24, 2005); see
also Ongstad v. Piper Jaffray & Co., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1092 (D.N.D. 2006).
In Ongstad,an action involving the unauthorized trading of securities, CAFA's
jurisdictional trigger was not established when the district court was merely
provided with the number of open accounts, the number of clients and the
amount of assets. Ongstad, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1092. The court observed that
"there is little that can be drawn from such figures" and that it was being
'asked to speculate as to the potential large dollar amounts at stake based on
the total value of assets held." Id. Ongstad recognized that there was "no
inherent correlation between the total value of the assets and the amount of
damages sustained as a result of unauthorized transactions." Id.; see also
Wheeler v. Allstate Floridian Indemn. Co., No. 3:05CV 208/NCR/EMT, 2006
WL 1133249, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2006) (holding that the defendant failed

2006]

Developing Trends in CAFA

be established by the removing defendant through the use of
interrogatory answers or admissions in state court, through
calculations taken directly from the complaint's allegations, from
settlement demands and through affidavits or declarations from
the defendant's employees or experts. 4 Additionally, on removal,
"[a] court may accept the uncontested, good faith allegations of
jurisdictional facts, though of course it may also notice a
jurisdictional defect sua sponte. "u=
In evaluating whether removal is proper, "[t]he question is
not what damages the plaintiff will [likely] recover, but what
amount is 'in controversy' between the parties."2 So for example,
"the effect of any applicable statutes of limitations" should not be
taken into consideration in determining whether CAFA's five
million dollar aggregate threshold is met. 257 As one court recently
explained: "When determining the amount in controversy for
jurisdictional purposes, however, courts cannot look past the
complaint to the merits of a defense that has not yet been
established.""
The plaintiff is the master of his case and may attempt to
limit his claim to avoid federal jurisdiction under CAFA. Several
pre-CAFA decisions suggest "a plaintiff in state court may be able
to prevent removal by committing to accept less than the federal
to establish CAFA's aggregate threshold in a putative class action under
Florida's Value Policy Law by failing to provide the total amount of coverage
available under other class members' policies or the amount of their potential
claims). In Wheeler Defendant's argument, which merely pointed to the
amount of the named plaintiffs' claim and suggested that CAFA's threshold
was met if that claim was representative of the value of other class members'
claims, was found to be insufficient by the district court. Id.; see also
Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1331-32 (concluding CAFA's amount in controversy was
not established through the defendant's declaration which estimated the
number of ranges/ovens sold in Florida based upon the national percentage of
units registered post-sale, and the manufacturer's suggested retail price
("MSRP")). The Eleventh Circuit in Miedema recognized that the MSRP
information did not reflect the damages, interest, or costs being sought, and
that the registration information assumed the rate of registration by
Floridians paralleled the national average, an assumption the court was
unwilling to make. Id. at 1332. See also DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of New
York, LLC, 469 F.3d 271, 276-77 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding CAFA's amount in
controversy was not established in an action for an accounting to determine if
the defendant had made improper deductions from a pool of funds where the
complaint failed to allege the amount being claimed or the value of the pool
itself. The fact that defendant settled a similar class action for $5.25 million
did not save the case from remand.) Id. at 276-78.
254. Meridian, 441 F.3d at 541-42.
255. Karazanos v. Madison Two Associates, 147 F.3d 624, 626 (7th Cir.
1998).
256. Brill, 427 F.3d at 448.
257. Miedema, 450 F.3d at 1322 n.9.
258. See id. (citing Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Mitchell Enters., Inc., 417
F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1969)).
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jurisdictional minimum."259 However, those decisions refer to a
"binding cap" on damages and recognize that in many
jurisdictions, such as Illinois, a party is permitted to recover more
than what is requested in a complaint's prayer for relief. Indeed,
in subsequent decisions, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a
defendant should still be able to remove a case to federal court in
this scenario and explained that in such instances "the district
court may look outside the pleadings to other evidence of
jurisdictional amount in the record.""6
The Second Circuit
recently endorsed a similar approach under CAFA, noting that
even where a plaintiff is permitted by state law to limit his or her
"monetary claims to avoid the amount in controversy threshold"
and attempts to do so, a court "must look to see if the plaintiffs
actual monetary demands in the aggregate exceed the threshold,
irrespective
of whether the plaintiff states that the demands do
26 1
not."

It is clear that "once a case is successfully removed a plaintiff
cannot do anything to defeat federal jurisdiction and force a
remand."2 6 The Supreme Court in St. Paul Mercury held that a
district court is not divested of jurisdiction where a "plaintiff after
removal, by stipulation, by affidavit, or by amendment of [the]
pleadings, reduces the claim below the requisite amount. "2 In a
class action context, the named plaintiffs' stipulation that they
would not seek or even accept damages in excess of $75,000 is
259. Barbers, Hairstyling For Men & Women Inc. v. Bishop, 132 F.3d 1203,
1205 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 366 (7th
Cir. 1993) (suggesting that a plaintiff may avoid federal jurisdiction by asking

for less than the jurisdictional threshold "so long as the plaintiff, should she
prevail, isn't legally certain to recover more").

260. Chase, 110 F.3d at 427-28. Chase further cautioned however, that a
district court "is limited to examining only that evidence of amount in
controversy that was available at the moment the petition for removal was

filed." Id. at 428; see also, Eufaula Drugs, Inc. v. TDI Managed Care Servs.,
Inc., No. 2:05-CV-293-MEF, 2006 WL 986976, at *2-3 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 14, 2006)
(holding that plaintiffs complaint asserting that it was not bringing any claim
for relief "in excess of $74,500 in the aggregate for each plaintiff or class

member," an obvious attempt to dodge traditional diversity jurisdiction, did
not preclude removal under CAFA where the defendant presented affidavits
demonstrating that the amount "in controversy" exceeded CAFA's
jurisdictional threshold).
261. Morgan, 471 F.3d at 474-75. The Morgan court also expressed a word
of caution for parties who seek to dodge federal jurisdiction through this tactic.
It concluded that plaintiffs "should not be permitted to ostensibly limit their
damages to avoid federal court only to receive an award in excess of the
federal amount in controversy requirement. The plaintiff has made her choice
and the plaintiffs in state court who choose not to opt out of the class must live
with it." Id. at 477-78.
262. See Shaw, 994 F.2d at 367; Chase, 110 F.3d at 429 (holding that "postremoval affidavits or stipulations are ineffective to oust federal jurisdiction").
263. St. PaulMercury, 303 U.S. at 303.
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simply not binding on "other members of the class."2" Recently,
one district court addressed a plaintiffs attempt to cap a class's
total recovery at less than $5,000,000 in an apparent attempt to
dodge CAFA. In rejecting the suggestion that the amount in
controversy did not meet CAFA's jurisdictional threshold, the
district court concluded that "a cap is effective only if it is alleged
in good faith" and that the "[p]laintiff cannot in good faith place a
$5,000,000 limitation on the recovery of the putative class."26 '

VIII. ACCELERATED APPELLATE REVIEW OF REMAND ORDERS
A party objecting to removal can file a motion to remand a
case to state court. Where the motion is based on a defect in
removal procedure, the motion to remand must be brought within
thirty days of the filing of the notice of removal under § 1446(a).
Where a jurisdictional defect provides the basis for remand, the
motion may be brought "at any time before final judgment."2"
However, "an erroneous refusal to remand a case" to state court is
not "a jurisdictional error" that "remain[s] corrigible until the
litigation becomes final by issuance of a final judgment and
exhaustion of appellate remedies."267
Generally, an order remanding a case to state court is not69
reviewable on appeal." Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
observed that a remand based on one of the grounds specified in
§ 1447(c) is immune from appellate review under § 1447(d).27 °
However, where the order remanding the case is not based on a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in the removal
procedure, appellate review may be permitted under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, which confers jurisdiction over appeals from final

264. See Pfizer Inc. v. Lott, 417 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Manguno v.
Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 724 (5th Cir. 2002)).
265. Fiore, 2005 WL 3434074, at *3; see also Buller Trucking Co. v. Owner
Operator Ind. Driver Risk Retention Group, Inc., 461 F.Supp.2d 768, 779 (S.D.
Ill., 2006) (holding a complaint's express disclaimer of any recovery in excess
of $75,000 was not effective to dodge federal count jurisdiction (citing Smith v.
Pfizer, No. 05-CV-0112-MJR, 2005 WL 3618319 at *3-4 (S.D. Ill., March 24,
2005) (concluding that a disclaimer in the ad damnum clause of a complaint
cannot preclude a recovery in excess of $75,000 because under Illinois law, the
prayer for relief does not limit the damages that a party may recover))).
266. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000).
267. Santamarinav. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 F.3d 570, 572 (7th Cir. 2006)
(permitting an appeal following the denial of a motion to reconsider a ruling
made 15 months earlier denying a motion to remand because among other
things, the defendant did not argue that plaintiffs failure to appeal the
original ruling barred appellate review of the motion to reconsider).
268. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2000).
269. 517 U.S. 706 (1996).
270. Id. at 711-12.
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decisions.271 In Quackenbush, the Court held that a remand based
on abstention grounds was appealable under § 1291.272
While CAFA provides that § 1447 applies to the removal of a
class action, it permits an appeal from an order "grantingor
denying a motion to remand" the action.273
The appeal is
discretionary in nature. 74 CAFA is silent as to those factors which
an appellate court should consider when determining to accept or
decline an application for appellate review. However, Rule 23(f) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure similarly permits a
discretionary appeal from an order granting or denying class
certification. In addressing when to accept an appeal under Rule
23(f), the Seventh Circuit concluded:
[Ilt would be a mistake for us to draw up a list that determines how
the power under Rule 23(f) will be exercised. Neither a bright line
approach nor a catalog of factors would serve well - especially at
the outset, when courts necessarily must experiment with the new
class of appeals.275
The Seventh Circuit felt the better approach was to "keep in mind
the reasons [the rule] came into being," one of which was to
"facilitate the development of the law." 76 In reaching that
conclusion, the Seventh Circuit aptly recognized that "some
fundamental issues about class actions [were] poorly developed. "r 7
The same can be said as to law surrounding orders granting or
denying motions to remand in light of § 1447(d)'s general
prohibition of appellate review. 278 Therefore, a similar approach is
likely to be followed on CAFA appeals and counsel should argue
the need for development of a particular issue in an appellate
petition where appropriate.
Because the appellate review available under CAFA is
discretionary in nature, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
271. Id. at 712-13.
272. Id. at 714.
273. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added).
274. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(2) ("[If the Court of Appeals accepts an appeal
under paragraph (1)." (emphasis added)); Tmesys, Inc. v. Eufaula Drugs, Inc.,
462 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2006) ("CAFA provides [appellate courts]
discretionary appellate jurisdiction to review such [remand] orders.");
Amalgamated Transit Union, 435 F.3d at 1145 ("[The statute and its history

show that Congress intended to create an appeal that is within the court of
appeals' discretion."); Morgan v. Gay (Morgan 1), 466 F.3d 276, 277 (3d Cir.
2006) ("Section 1453(c)(1), by using the phrase 'may accept an appeal,'

provides this Court with discretion as to whether we should grant this
petition.").
275. Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999).
276. Id. at 834-35.
277. Id. at 835.
278. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 49, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 46

(arguing that class actions are better suited for federal rather than state
courts).
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(FRAP) 5 governs the initiation of such an appeal.279 Rather than
filing a notice of appeal, FRAP 5 requires a petition (not to exceed
20 pages in length) that sets forth: (1) a statement of facts
necessary to understand the question presented; (2) the question
or issue presented; (3) the relief being sought; (4) the reasons why
the appeal should be allowed; and, (5) its statutory authorization. 2" The filing of a notice of appeal rather than a Rule 5
petition can result in a dismissal of the appeal.281
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report explains that "[n]ew
subsection 1453(c) provides discretionary appellate review of
remand orders under this legislation but also imposes time limits.
Specifically, parties must file a notice of appeal within seven days
after entry of a remand order." 82 However, § 1453(c) as drafted
provides:
[A] court of appeals may accept an appeal from an order of a district
court granting or denying a motion to remand a class action to the
State court from which it was removed if application is made to the
court of appeals not less than 7 days after entry of the order. 283
Taken literally, § 1453(c) would not permit an appeal to be
taken until seven days elapsed following the entry of a remand
order.'
The Tenth Circuit was the first court of appeals to
interpret CAFA and failed to initially comment upon this apparent
drafting error in its Pritchett I decision.8 5 When the issue was
subsequently brought to its attention, the Tenth Circuit issued a
superseding opinion that specifically addressed this issue.286 In
PritchettII, it observed that, in light of "Congress' stated intent to
impose time limits on appeals of class action remand orders...
[there] [i]s no plausible reason why the text of [the] Act would
instead impose a seven-day waiting period followed by a limitless
window for appeal." 287 The court concluded that this was "one of
the rare cases in which a 'literal application of the statute will

279. Amalgamated Transit Union, 435 F.3d. at 1144-45; Patterson v. Dean
Morris, L.L.P., 444 F.3d 365, 368-69 (5th Cir. 2006); Evans v. Walter Indus.,
Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006); Hart,457 F.3d. at 678-79.
280. See FED. R. APP. P. 5(b), (c); Main Drug, Inc. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare,
Inc., Nos. 06-12419, 06-12420, 2007 WL 92756, at *4 (11th Cir., Jan. 16, 2007).
281. Main Drug, 2007 WL 92756, at *2-4 (noting that the requirements of

FRAP 5 are jurisdictional and holding even if they were not, the notice of
appeal would still have to be dismissed because it did not comply with Rule 5).
282. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 49, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 46.
283. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added).

284. Bush v. Cheaptickets, Inc., 425 F.3d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 2005).
285. PritchettI, 404 F.3d at 1232.
286. Pritchett11, 420 F.3d at 1093 n.2.
287. Id.; see also Morgan 1, 466 F.3d at 278 ("As written, § 1453(c)(1) would
grant plaintiffs and defendants the ability to potentially abuse the litigation
process because the party who loses on the district court's remand ruling could
strategically wait to appeal the remand decision at any time pre-trial.").
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produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the
The Tenth Circuit therefore held that § 1453(c)
drafters."''
contained "a typographical error" and should be read as providing
"that an appeal is permissible if filed 'not more than' seven days
after entry of the remand order." 9 The Third, Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits
subsequently
reached
the
same
conclusion.'
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit explained that because CAFA
"does not specify the [seven day filing] deadline as calendar days,
we construe the seven days as court days, thereby excluding
intermediate weekends and holidays.""9
Where an appeal is accepted, CAFA requires that the
appellate court complete all action on the appeal, including the
rendering of a judgment within sixty days unless an extension is
granted.
CAFA permits an extension of the sixty day time
limitation "for any period of time" where "all parties to the
proceedings agree." 3 In the event that all parties cannot reach an
agreement, an extension "for a period not to exceed [ten] days" is
permitted where good cause is shown and the interests of justice
warrant the extension. 4 CAFA provides that if the court of
appeals does not issue its final judgment within the time frame
noted above, "the appeal shall be denied." 5 Since the appeal is
discretionary in nature, the sixty day time limit does not begin to
run until the court of appeals enters an order granting permission
to appeal.'
The discretionary appellate process permitted under CAFA
only applies to orders stemming from removals sought under
CAFA. It does not confer appellate jurisdiction where the removal
was grounded on some other statutory basis.297

288. Id. (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235, 242
(1989)).
289. Id. at 1093 n.2.
290. Amalgamated Transit Union, 435 F.3d at 1146; Miedema, 450 F.3d at
1326; Morgan, 466 F.3d at 279.
291. Id. (emphasis in original).
292. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(2) (Supp. 2005).
293. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(3)(B).
294. Id.
295. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(4).
296. Bush, 425 F.3d at 685-86; Patterson, 444 F.3d at 368-69; Evans, 449
F.3d at 1162; Hart, 457 F.3d at 678; DiTolla, 469 F.3d at 275 ("CAFA's 60 day
clock for rendering judgment starts running on the day that the Court's order
granting permission to appeal is filed.").
297. See Wallace v. La. Citizens Property Ins. Corp., 444 F.3d 697, 700 (5th
Cir. 2006) (holding that CAFA's appellate provisions did not apply where the

removal was based on the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(B)); Saab v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 469 F.3d 758, 759
(8th Cir. 2006) ("[Section] 1453(c)(1) does not permit us to accept an appeal

from the denial of a motion to remand when a class action has been removed
to federal court on the basis of traditional diversity jurisdiction, § 1332(a).").
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Finally, the Seventh Circuit has suggested that "it is
arguable... that motions to reconsider orders denying remands
under [CAFA], are disfavored. " " Indeed, the expedited appellate
review process contemplated under the Act was intended to not
only bring some clarity to the law of remand but also to provide
the parties with some measure of certainty as to whether they
would be litigating the class action in a state or federal forum.
That measure of certainty will be lost if parties are permitted to
appeal from a untimely filed motion to reconsider the denial of a
motion to remand. If allowed, such a strategy could result in
discovery abuses and a waste of federal judicial resources. That
should be a key consideration in determining whether to accept a
discretionary appeal under § 1453(c).
IX. QUALIFYING "MASS ACTIONS" SUBJECT To
CAFA's DIvERsITY AND REMOVAL RULES
Section 1332(d)(11)(A) provides that "a mass action shall be
deemed to be a class action removable under [§ 1332(d)(2) through
(d)(10)] if it otherwise meets the provisions of those paragraphs."'
In other words, the minimal diversity rules and jurisdictional
exceptions as well as the revised removal rules discussed above
apply to mass actions as defined in CAFA. While at first blush,
paragraph (d)(11)(A) may appear to be straightforward, "Congress'
use of the word 'removable' in the text of § 1332, a statute
establishing original jurisdiction, blurs what had previously been a
clear distinction between jurisdiction and removal statutes, and
this obscures the reach of jurisdiction over mass actions."0 °
Things get even murkier when CAFA's definition of a mass action
is added to the equation.
CAFA defines a "mass action" as "any civil action [other than
a class action] ... in which monetary relief' (as opposed to
injunctive or equitable relief) is sought, and involves "claims of 100
or more persons ...proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that
30 1
the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact."
However, this section of the Act further provides that "jurisdiction
shall only exist over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action

298. Santamarina,466 F.3d at 572 (observing the case was removed and the
motion for remand was denied "only a few months after the promulgation of
[CAFA], when there was no significant case law interpreting the Act. So some
latitude in considering what might in other circumstances indeed be a belated
motion to reconsider should be permitted."). Santamarinamade it clear "for
future reference" that an erroneous denial of a motion to remand is not a
jurisdictional defect that "remain[s] corrigible until the litigation becomes
final." Id.
299. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A) (Supp. 2005).
300. Abrego, 443 F.3d at 682.
301. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
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under
requirements
amount
jurisdictional
the
satisfy
[§ 1332](a)." °2 In other words, the value of each plaintiffs claim
must meet diversity's traditional $75,000 threshold or the claim
will be remanded. Thus, CAFA expands the district court's
removal jurisdiction to include mass actions where the aggregate
amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, but leaves in place the
rule that the court has subject matter jurisdiction only over those
plaintiffs whose claims seek at least $75,000.
CAFA's definition of a mass action appears to codify Zahn's
non-aggregation rule regarding diversity's traditional amount-incontroversy requirement for subject matter jurisdiction. However,
as discussed above, Zahn was recently overturned by the Supreme
Court in Exxon Mobil. Thus, for mass actions encompassed by
CAFA, § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) actually retracts the scope of a district
court's supplemental jurisdiction as recognized in Exxon Mobil.
Section 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) contains both CAFA's definition of a
"mass action" and the limitation that jurisdiction only exists over
those claims which meet diversity's traditional amount-incontroversy requirement. How will courts handle scenarios where
a mass action initially has the requisite number of claims to meet
CAFA's numerical requirement (100 or more), but where the
number of claims that do not meet the diversity's traditional
amount-in-controvery would bring the total number of claims
beneath CAFA's numerical definitional floor? Should the entire
group of claims collectively be remanded to state court, or only
those claims which do not involve a jurisdictionally sufficient
amount?
Congress could have directly tied diversity's traditional
amount-in-controvery requirement to CAFA's definition of a mass
action by defining a mass action as any civil action other than a
class action in which the claims of 100 or more persons seeking
monetary relief, each having an amount in controversy in excess of
$75,000 exclusive of interests and costs, are proposed to be tried
jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common
questions of law or fact. However, Congress did not take that
Rather, it separated
approach in drafting § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
diversity's traditional amount-in-controversy requirement from
CAFA's numerical mass-action floor by providing that federal
jurisdiction exists only over those individual claims that otherwise
This
satisfy diversity's traditional jurisdictional threshold.
suggests that only specific individual claims, rather than the
entire lot, would be subject to remand in such a scenario. This
construction of CAFA is supported by the Senate Judiciary
Committee Report, which indicates:

302. Id.
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Under the proviso, however, it is the Committee's intent that any
claims that are included in the mass action that standing alone do
not satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements of Section
1332(a) (currently $75,000), would be remanded to state court.
Subsequent remands of individual claims not meeting the Section
1332 jurisdictional amount requirement may take the action below
the 100-plaintiff jurisdictional threshold .... However, so long as
the mass action meets the various jurisdictional requirements at the
time of removal, it is the Committee's view that those subsequent
remands should not extinguish federal diversity jurisdiction over the
action. °3
The Ninth Circuit recently observed that "[tihis clarification is
consistent with a logical reading of the statue," but found it
unnecessary to reach the issue, or endorse this approach. 30, In
that case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that an entire mass action
had to be remanded because the defendant failed to establish that
even one claimant met the traditional $75,000 threshold for
subject matter jurisdiction. °5
One way to reconcile the interplay of Sections 1332(d)ll(A)
and (B) is to view paragraph 11(A) as CAFA's jurisdictional grant
by virtue of its incorporation of § 1332(d)(2)'s value aggregation
rule, and paragraph 11(B) as creating an exception to that
jurisdictional grant through its incorporation of § 1332(a)'s
traditional amount-in-controversy requirement for individual
claims. While the inclusion of CAFA's definition of the term mass
action in paragraph 11(B) muddies the water a bit, this approach
to the interplay of paragraphs 11(A) and (B) is logical and
consistent with the Senate Committee Report.3 "
It should be recognized that, in addition to CAFA's
jurisdictional exceptions for class actions found in Sections
1332(d)(3), (4) and (5), CAFA contains several additional

303. S.REP. No. 109-14, at 47, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 44.
304. Abrego, 443 F.3d at 686-87.
305. Id. at 689.
306. One district court recently concluded that a defendant could only
remove the individual claims of those plaintiffs "that exceed $75,000 in value
and were commenced" prior to CAFA's effective date. Lowery v. Honeywell
Int'l, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1293-94 (N.D. Ala. 2006). In rejecting the
argument that only individual cases should be remanded, the district court
noted "[tihere is no [similar] jurisdictional limitation for individual plaintiffs
in class actions." Id. at 1295. That observation merely begs the question, it
does not answer it. While CAFA's mass action provisions are admittedly
clumsy, the district courts interpretation appears to conflict with the
legislative intent and the text of the statute itself. Ultimately, because the
removing defendant had not established that any of the individual cases had a
value in excess of $75,000, the entire group of cases was remanded to state
court.
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07
Where one of the following
exceptions specific to mass actions."
exceptions are triggered, traditional diversity and removal rules
apply:

Where all claims arise from an occurrence in the State where the
action was filed which allegedly resulted in injuries in that state or
in contiguous states;
Where the claims were joined on defendant's motion;
Where the claims are asserted on behalf of the general public and
not on behalf of individual claimants or class members pursuant to a
state statute authorizing the action; or
Where the claims have been consolidated or coordinated solely for
pretrial proceedings or discovery.au
Whether CAFA's class action or its mass action provisions are
potentially applicable turns on how the claims were filed. Because
the definition of a mass action specifically excludes civil actions
filed pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
or an analogous state statute or rule of procedure authorizing the
filing as a class action, counsel should carefully review the original
pleading(s). If no reference is made in the pleading to a procedural
rule authorizing its filing as a class action, then CAFA's mass
action provisions can potentially be invoked.
For a "mass action" encompassed by CAFA, § 1332(d)(11)(C)(i)
prohibits any subsequent transfer of the action unless a majority
of the plaintiffs request the transfer. This provision is obviously
directed at conditional, or tag-along transfer orders that are
typically entered in federal multi-district litigation.309 A practice
that has come under some criticism in mass tort cases is for
defense counsel, upon removing an action to federal court, to
immediately initiate a "reference" to the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation which will then order the case transferred
to the district court designated to handle consolidated pretrial
proceedings.310 "This 'strategy allows the defense counsel to
attempt to secure a transfer order or conditional transfer order
307. Because § 1332(d)(11)(A) states that a mass action shall be treated as a
class action "removable under paragraphs (2) through (10) if it otherwise meets
the provisionsof those paragraphs"a defendant removing a mass action must

not only navigate through CAFA's class action diversity exceptions found in 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3), (4) and (5), but also the jurisdictional exceptions
specifically applicable in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i), (ii).

308. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii).
309. See Delaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d 147, 155-56
(D. Mass. 2006) (illustrating a conditional order).
310. Mike Roberts, MultidistrictLitigation and the Judicial Panel, Transfer
and Tag-Along Orders Prior to a Determination of Remand: Proceduraland
Substantive Problem or Effective JudicialPublic Policy?, 23 MEMPHIS ST. U.L.
REV. 841, 842 (1993).
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before the original federal district court determines, and in some
cases even hears, the anticipated motion to remand. '"31' When
applicable, § 1332(d)(11)(c)(i) would seemingly prohibit that
practice. CAFA's limitation on additional transfers of mass tort
actions does not apply where a class has been certified under Rule
23 or where plaintiffs propose the action proceed as a class
action.'
Finally, the statute of limitations for claims removed under
CAFA's "mass action" provisions are tolled during the period of
time the claims are pending in federal court.313
X.

SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES FOR FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS

CAFA
imposes
additional
notification
requirements
applicable to the settlement of any class action in which one or
more classes have been certified." 4 Section 1715(b) specifies that:
Not later than 10 days after a proposed settlement of a class action
is filed in court, each defendant that is participating in a proposed
settlement shall serve upon the appropriate State official of each
State in which a class member resides and the appropriate Federal
official a notice of the proposed settlement.3 '
The notice must include the following:
(1)

the complaint, any materials accompanying the complaint
and any amended complaints;

(2)

"notice of any scheduled judicial hearing";

(3)

"any proposed or final notification to class members" of
their right to opt out of the class action or, when
applicable, that no such right exists;

(4) the terms of any proposed or final settlement of the class
action;
(5)

any "agreement contemporaneously made between class
counsel and defense counsel";

311. Delaventura, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 155 (quoting Roberts, supra note 310,
at 843).
312. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(C)(ii).
313. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(D).
314. See 28 U.S.C. § 1711(2) (Supp. 2005) (defining the term "class action" to
include "any civil action filed in a district court of the United States under rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" (emphasis added)). Thus, the
notification requirements found in § 1715(b) are not limited to class actions
where federal court jurisdiction is based on CAFA's revised diversity rules but
to any federal court class action.
315. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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(6)

"any final judgment or notice of dismissal";

(7)

"the names of class members who reside in each State
and the estimated proportionate share of their claims to
the entire settlement to that state's appropriate state
official," or where this information cannot be feasibly
provided "a reasonable estimate of the number of class
members residing in each State and the estimated
proportionate share of the[ir claims to the entire
settlement;" and

(8)

any written judicial opinion relating to the items above."'

Section 1715(b)(1) provides that the materials filed with the
complaint are "not required to be served" if they are available
through the internet and the notice explains how the materials
can be accessed electronically. 1 ' In light of CAFA's definition of a
class action as "any civil action filed in a district court" or "that is
removed to a district court," § 1715's notice requirements apply to
any federal class action commenced after CAFA's effective date
and are not limited to those removed by a defendant to federal
court.
CAFA specifies that "lain order giving final approval of a
proposed settlement may not be issued earlier than 90 days after
the later of the dates on which the appropriate Federal official and
the appropriate State official" were served with this notice." 8 The
obvious purpose of this section is to provide federal or state
officials with the opportunity to object to a proposed settlement
that appears to be unfair to some or all class members or that
might conflict with the regulatory policy, custom, or practices of a
state or federal agency.
Normally, in the absence of an agreement between the
parties, the class representatives bear the expense of notifying
class members about a proposed settlement.319 CAFA imposes
upon the defendants the cost of notifying the state and federal
officials of any proposed settlement. This could prove to be a timeconsuming, expensive and potentially onerous proposition,
especially where a nationwide class has been certified, which
would require that notice be sent to the appropriate officials in all
fifty states.
The penalty for noncompliance with CAFA's notice
requirements is class members "may refuse to comply with and
may choose not to be bound by a settlement agreement or consent
316. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b)(1)-(8).
317. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b)(1).
318. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(d).
319. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) (holding
that individual notice must be sent to identifiable class members, and that the
expense be born by petitioner).
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decree in a class action."32 ° The class member bears the burden of
proving that the notice required under this rule was not
"
'
provided.32
Since each defendant must provide notice under this rule, a
single defendant's failure to provide notice would seemingly not
permit a class member to dodge the preclusive impact of a
settlement where one or more of the other defendants furnished
the required notice. So long as the appropriate state and federal
officials received proper notice of the proposed settlement, the
purpose of CAFA's notification requirements has been fulfilled.
Nothing useful can be gained by permitting a class member to "opt
out" under those circumstances, other than the potential
As the Senate Judiciary
proliferation of related litigation.
Committee Report explains: "[T]his provision is intended to
address situations in which defendants have simply defaulted on
their notification obligations," and "that a settlement should not be
undermined because of a defendant's innocent error about which
federal or state official should have received the required notice in
a particular case. " '
CAFA does include a fail-safe provision under which class
members are bound by a settlement agreement or consent decree if
the notice required by § 1715(b) was sent "to the appropriate
Federal official and to either the State attorney general or the
person that has primary regulatory, supervisory, or licensing
Thus, as explained below, notice
authority over the defendant."
should always be sent to the state attorney general for each state
in which a class member resides.
A. AppropriateFederal Officials
The appropriate federal official to whom notice of a proposed
class-action settlement should be sent is the Attorney General of
the United States, except where the defendant is a bank. 24 Where
the defendant is either a state or federal depository institution, a
state or federal depository institution holding company, a foreign
bank, or a "non-depository institution subsidiary of the foregoing"
the appropriate federal official is the person who has the "primary
federal regulatory or supervisory responsibility with respect to the
defendant, if some or all of the matters alleged in the class action
are subject to regulation or supervision by that person.""

320. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(e)(1).
321. Id.
322. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 35, as reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 34.

323. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(e)(2).
324. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(a)(1)(A).
325. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(a)(1)(B), (c).
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B. AppropriateState Officials
The "appropriate state official" is "the person in the State"
who either: (1) "has the primary regulatory or supervisory
responsibility" over the defendant, or (2) "licenses or otherwise
authorizes the defendant to conduct business in the State" so long
as "some or all of the matters alleged in the class action are
subject to regulation by that person."" 6 In the event "there is no
primary regulator, supervisor, or licensing authority," or where
the issues involved in the class action "are not subject to
regulation or supervision by that person," then a state's attorney
general is considered the appropriate state official for receiving
notice of the proposed settlement.'
Where the defendant is a
state bank (depository institution), notice should be directed to
"the State bank supervisor... of the State in which the defendant
is incorporated or chartered," and upon the appropriate federal
official so long as "some or all" of the issues in the class action "are
subject to regulation or supervision" by the state bank
supervisor. 32
In light of § 1715(e)(2)'s fail-safe provision which prevents a
class member from dodging the binding effect of a settlement when
notice is sent to the state attorney general, defendants should send
the required notice to the attorney general of each state in which a
class member resides, as well as to any other state official who
arguably has "supervisory, regulatory or licensing authority over a
defendant."
CAFA imposes no penalty for providing too many
state officials with notice. This will prevent class members from
attempting to dodge the impact of a settlement by claiming notice
was not sent to the official in their state who had the primary
licensing, regulatory, or supervisory responsibility over the
defendant or that the issues raised in the action were not subject
to regulation or supervision by the state official to whom the notice
was sent.

XI. RULE 23'S CLASS SETTLEMENT HEARING REQUIREMENT IS
UNAFFECTED BY THE ACT

Rule 23(e)(1)(A) requires court approval of a class-action
settlement only where a class had been certified. The Advisory
Committee notes to Rule 23(e)(1)(A) explain that "[tihe new rule
requires approval only if the claims, issues, or defenses of a
certified class are resolved by a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or
compromise." ° CAFA should not impact or change this practice.

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

28 U.S.C. § 1715(a)(2).
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1715(c)(2).
28 U.S.C. § 1715(e)(2).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(A) advisory committee's notes.
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Sections 1712, 1713, 1714 and 1715 all employ the term "proposed
settlement [sI," which is one of the few terms defined by CAFA, and
§ 1711(6) defines a "proposed settlement" as "an agreement
regarding a class action that is subject to court approval and that
if approved, would be binding on some or all class members.""'
Because court approval under Rule 23(e) is only required for
certified classes, CAFA's settlement hearing requirements do not
apply to settlements that occur prior to certification of a class.
A. Coupon and Net-Loss Settlements
Section 3 of CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1712, limits the recovery of
attorney's fees in "coupon settlements" and requires a court
hearing to address the reasonableness and adequacy of any
"coupon settlement.""2
However, CAFA fails to define what
constitutes a "coupon" or what qualifies as a "coupon settlement."
This omission was probably intentional in view of the wide variety
of settlement options that might arguably be characterized as a
coupon settlement.
Section 1712's provisions limiting attorney's fees in "coupon
settlements" provides some insight into the type of settlements
Congress was targeting. Section 1712(a) requires that any portion
of class counsel's fee award from a settlement involving coupons
"be based on the value.., of the coupons that are redeemed."" '
This suggests that Congress was targeting certificate or voucher
settlements that require a class member to redeem a certificate or
some type of paper in order to obtain the benefit of the proposed
settlement. However, Webster's Dictionary defines redeem as: to
buy back, or repurchase. 5 CAFA's coupon provisions will likely
extend to settlements that require class members to purchase
additional services or benefits at a discount through the use of a
certificate or voucher system. Whether this provision extends to
settlements that provide members with free additional services,
benefits, or "in-kind compensation" is less certain, and may turn
on other features of the settlement agreement."6 Clarification of
331. 28 U.S.C. § 1711(6) (Supp. 2005).
332. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (Supp. 2005).
333. For a discussion of coupon settlement options that might trigger
CAFA's application, see Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to
Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49
UCLA L. REV. 991, 994 (2002) (noting that "[slettlement coupons may
resemble traditional promotional coupons, housing vouchers, or discount
contracts"(internal citation omitted)).
334. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a).
335. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 986 (1983).
336. The Seventh Circuit has recognized: "'[Clompensation in kind is worth
less than cash of the same nominal value,' since, as is typical with coupons,
some percentage ... claimed by class members will never be used and, as a
result, will not constitute a cost to [the defendant]." Synfuel Techs., Inc. v.
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what constitutes a "coupon settlement" is of primary importance to
§ 1712's limitation on attorney's fees for class counsel because
CAFA's attorney's fees provisions are limited to coupon
settlements 7 and, as explained below, CAFA's coupon settlement
hearing procedures are largely redundant of what is already
required by Rule 23(e).
B. Coupon Settlement Hearing Requirement
Rule 23(e)(1)(A) requires court approval of any "settlement,
voluntary dismissal, or compromise of the claims, issues, or
defenses of a certified class. " " Rule 23(e)(1)(C) provides that a
court can approve a settlement or compromise of a class action
"that would bind class members only after a hearing and on
finding that the settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise is
fair, reasonable, and adequate. " 9 The Seventh Circuit "insist[s]
that district courts 'exercise the highest degree of vigilance in
scrutinizing proposed settlements of class actions,'" and describes
a district court's role in evaluating a class action settlement as one
"akin 'to the high duty of care that the law requires of
fiduciaries. ' 34 °
CAFA's required judicial scrutiny of coupon settlements for
the most part mirrors Rule 23(e)'s requirements. Section 1712(e)
requires a hearing and a written finding by the court that "the

DHL Express (USA), Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 654 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting In re
Mexico Money Transfer Litig., 267 F.3d 743, 748 (7th Cir. 2001). Synfuel
addressed a proposed class action settlement which the Seventh Circuit
vacated involving prepaid express letter envelopes "because the [district] court
did not adequately evaluate whether the settlement [was] fair to [the] class

members." Id. at 648. While noting that the Synfuel's class action was not
covered by CAFA because it was commenced prior to CAFA's effective date,
the Seventh Circuit nonetheless observed that "Congress required heightened
judicial scrutiny of coupon-based settlements" in CAFA. Id. at 654. While
also recognizing "that the pre-paid envelopes are not identical to coupons,

since they represent an entire product, not just a discount on a proposed
purchase," the Seventh Circuit in Synfuel concluded "they are a form of in-

kind compensation that shares some characteristics of coupons, including
forced future business with the defendant and, especially for heavier users,
the likelihood that the full amount of [the defendant's] gains will not be
disgorged." Id. Based on the sentiments expressed in Synfuel, it seems
inevitable that settlements involving this type of "in-kind compensation" will
fall under CAFA's attorney fee provisions and its coupon settlement hearing
requirements. Id.
337. Glass v. UBS Fin. Serv., Inc., No. C-06-4068 MMC, 2007 WL 221862, at
*16 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2007) (holding CAFA's attorney fee award provision,
§ 1712(a), "does not apply to non-coupon settlements").
338. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A).

339. Id. at 23(e)(1)(c).
340. Synfuel, 463 F.3d at 652-53 (quoting Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank,

288 F.3d 277, 279-280 (7th Cir. 2002)).
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settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for class members." "
CAFA does not list factors that a court should consider in
evaluating reasonableness or fairness of a coupon settlement. In
view of the wide array of terms and conditions that could
potentially be included in a "coupon" itself, this omission was also
probably deliberate.
Factors that have been considered in
evaluating the reasonableness of settlements include:
(1)

the complexity, duration and expense of the litigation;

(2)

the reaction of the class and the level of opposition to the
settlement;

(3)

the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery
completed;

(4)

the risks of establishing liability;

(5)

the risks of establishing damages;

(6)

the risks of maintaining a class action;

(7)

the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater
judgment;

(8)

the opinion of competent counsel;

(9)

the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of
the best recovery; and

(10) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of
all the attendant risks of litigation.342
However, "[tihe 'most important factor relevant to the fairness of a
class action settlement'" is: "'the strength of [the] plaintiffs case on
the merits balanced against the amount offered in the
settlement.' 34
Section 1712(e) authorizes a district court to "require that a
proposed settlement agreement provide for the distribution of a
portion of the value of unclaimed coupons to one or more
charitable or governmental organizations, as agreed to by the

341. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e) (Supp. 2005).
342. In re Gen. Motor Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 785 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir.

1996) (setting forth six factors that have been consistently used by courts in
evaluating the fairness of settlements); In re Mexico Money Transfer Litig.,
164 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1014 (N.D. Ill. 2000), affd, 267 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2001)

(discussing in detail six factors the court used to determine if a settlement was
reasonable).
343. Synfuel, 463 F.3d at 653 (quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp. Engine
Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1132 (7th Cir. 1979)).
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However, it has become common in class actions for

courts, using their broad equitable powers, to approve cy pres
distributions of residual settlement funds to charitable,
educational or public service entities or programs that provide
some benefit to the class members. u5 Additionally, § 1712(d)
permits a court to receive expert testimony from a qualified
witness as to "the actual value to the class members of the coupons
that are redeemed."'
Many district courts were also following
that practice even before CAFA became effective.347 Thus, these
provisions exemplify procedures already being followed in many
district courts.
C. Net-Loss Settlement HearingProcedures
CAFA changes the governing standard for approval of class
action settlements in which "any class member is obligated to pay
sums to class counsel that would result in a net loss to the class
member."'
In that scenario, the court approving the settlement
must make a finding that the "non-monetary benefits to the class
member[s] substantially outweigh the monetary loss."3 9 CAFA
offers no guidance on what type of benefits should be considered by
the court when engaged in this analysis or how those benefits
should be evaluated.
D. Prohibitionof Settlements Based on GeographicLocation
CAFA prohibits the settlement of any class action that
provides for the payment of a greater sum to class members "solely
on the basis that the class members to whom the greater sums are
to be paid are located in closer geographic proximity to the
court." 5 ° However, § 1714 does not preclude geographic proximity
as a factor that can never be considered for any purpose. For
example, proximity to an environmental contamination site is a
factor to be considered in fixing the amount paid to class members
who live near the site and are theoretically more likely to have
suffered an exposure and injury."' Rather, § 1714 targets
344. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(e).
345. See, e.g., Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 1998) (approving
cy pres to legal aid foundation); In re Three Mile Island Litig., 557 F. Supp. 96,
97 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (approving $5 million cy pres to finance public health and
evacuation planning); Fears v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., No. 02-Civ.
4911(HB), 2005 WL 1041134, at *10-16 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2005) (collecting
cases and authorizing cy pres to women's medical programs).
346. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(d).
347. See, e.g., Mexico Money Transfer, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1017-19 (illustrating
the use of several experts in assessing a settlement value).
348. 28 U.S.C. § 1713 (Supp. 2005).
349. Id.
350. 28 U.S.C. § 1714 (Supp. 2005).
351. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 32, as reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 31.
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settlements that have no legitimate basis to distinguish the
amounts paid to various class members other than their proximity
to the courthouse.
E. Attorney Fee ProvisionsIn Coupon Settlements
Rule 23(h) provides that in any action where a class has been
certified, a "court may award reasonable attorney fees and
nontaxable costs authorized by law or by agreement of the
parties."352 That rule requires class counsel claiming attorney fees
must do so pursuant to a motion under Rule 54(d)(2). Notice of the
motion must be served on all parties and must be "directed to class
members in a reasonable manner."'53 CAFA supplements Rule 23's
hearing requirements for claims involving coupon settlements.
Section 1712(a) requires that in any class action settlement
which "provides for a recovery of coupons to a class member, the
portion of any attorney's fee award to class counsel that is
attributable to the award of the coupons shall be based on the
3
value to class members of the coupons that are redeemed."
Where the "recovery of coupons is not used to determine the
attorney's fee" paid to class counsel, § 1712(b)(1) provides that the
fee award "shall be based upon the amount of time class counsel
reasonably expended working on the action."355 This is one of the
traditional criteria used in determining the appropriate amount of
a fee award to class counsel involved in the creation of a common
fund.
Section 1712(b)(2) specifies that in those cases where class
counsel obtained equitable relief, any fee award shall include an
appropriate fee for obtaining that relief.31 When a settlement
involves a combination of equitable relief and coupons for the class
members, § 1712(c) is consistent in requiring that the portion of
any fee award paid to class counsel based upon the inclusion of
coupons must be calculated on the value of the redeemed coupons
and the remaining portion of the fee award should be based on the
amount of time "reasonably expended" by class counsel.3 7
These provisions were drafted to provide an economic
incentive for class counsel to negotiate favorable terms for coupons
that are part of any class action settlement. Factors that limit the
number of coupons that are ultimately redeemed include: limits on
transferability, the timing of the coupon expiration date,
restrictions on the aggregation of coupons, administrative

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 23(h).

Id. at 23(h)(1).
28 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (Supp. 2005).
Id. at § 1712(b)(1).
Id. at § 1712(b)(2).
Id. at § 1712(c), (b)(1).
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obstacles to redemption, and product restrictions that limit the
items or services class members can acquire."
As a result of § 1712(a) and (c)'s requirement that the fee
award be based on the value of redeemed coupons, class counsel's
fees cannot be calculated until the time specified for redemption of
those coupons has expired. Some courts have permitted a fee
award to class counsel on the estimated likely rate of redemption
of the coupons involved in a settlement. CAFA now prohibits that
practice. Section 1712, however, does not preclude the payment of
class counsel's fees on a periodic installment basis where the
amount paid is based upon the actual number of coupons
redeemed during that installment period.'
This approach
ensures that the fee award is proportionate to the actual value to
the class, and minimizes the economic disincentive for class
counsel to negotiate a longer redemption period.
Additionally, the value a coupon provides to a class member is
reduced by any increase in the price of the goods or services
related to the coupon during its redemption period."
It is
doubtful however, that a court would take that into consideration
in calculating class counsel's fee award because counsel has no
real ability to control a defendant's pricing strategies.
XII. When is a Class Action Commenced?
Section 9 of CAFA provides that its amendments "shall apply
to any civil action commenced on or after the date of enactment of
this Act." 1 The President signed the Act into law on February 18,
2005, and its provisions do not apply retroactively.36
The
determination of when a class action is "commenced" has been the
most heavily litigated issue under CAFA since its enactment.
Federal courts have been universal in their narrow construction of
the commencement issue.
As one court of appeals explained, permitting the wholesale
removal of pre-existing state court class actions under CAFA
would "have serious consequences" not only for "the federal
judiciary," but also for their "colleagues on the state bench."
A
contrary approach was viewed by both Congress and the federal

358. See Leslie, supra note 320, at 1014-1029 (discussing restrictions on the
use of settlement coupons).

359. See Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 989 F. Supp. 375, 37879 (D. Mass. 1997) (addressing the "staging" of an attorney fee award in a
class action settlement to ensure "the fee awarded is appropriate to the value
actually received by the class members").
360. See Mexico Money Transfer, 267 F.3d at 748.
361. Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 9 (2005).

362. Exxon Mobil, 125 S. Ct. at 2628.
363. PritchettI, 404 F.3d at 1238.
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judiciary as being "disruptive to federal-state comity" principles."
As a result, it should come as no surprise that federal courts have
not been overly receptive to defense attempts to remove statecourt class actions filed prior to CAFA's effective date.
The Tenth Circuit3e5 concluded that a cause of action is
commenced for purposes of CAFA when it is originally filed in
state court, not when it is removed to federal district court.3
In
reaching that conclusion, the court recognized that when CAFA
was originally introduced in the House, it authorized removal not
only of actions "commenced" after its effective date, but also "cases
in which a class certification order [was] entered on or after the
enactment date."3 7 The Court further noted that "neither the
Senate version of the Bill nor the final statute passed by both
Houses of Congress provided for removal of actions certified on or
after the enactment date."M Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded,
"[bly excising the House provision, Congress signaled an intent to
narrow the removal provisions of the Act to exclude currently
pending [law]suits." 9
In a series of decisions, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the
Tenth Circuit's conclusion that a civil action is commenced for
purposes of CAFA when the action is filed with the state court, not
at some later time in its prosecution." '
As Judge Posner
explained:
While it is true that the proceeding in federal court was
"commenced" by the filing of the removal petition, that filing was
not the beginning of the suit. For what was removed was the suit
that had been brought in the Illinois state court, and under
Illinois
3 71
law the filing of the complaint had "commenced" the suit.

364. Id.
365. 420 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005) (amending and superseding PritchettI).
366. Id. at 1094-96.
367. Id. at 1095.
368. Id.
369. Id.; see also Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 424 F.3d 43, 44 (1st Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (adopting Pritchett's interpretation of the commencement issue and
rejecting the contention that the length of time a case had been pending in
state court was a distinguishing factor that would justify removal); Bush, 425
F.3d at 686 ("CAFA's 'commenced' language surely refers to when the action
was originally commenced in state court. It is axiomatic that an individual or
entity may not remove a dispute before it has commenced in state court.").
370. Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (Knudsen 1), 411 F.3d 805, 806 (7th
Cir. 2005); see also Pfizer, 417 F.3d at 726 (explaining that "'commenced'
indeed means 'filed' rather than 'removed"); Schorsch v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,

417 F.3d 748, 749-50 (7th Cir. 2005) (reiterating the meaning of "commenced"
as set forth in Knudsen and Pfizer); Schillinger, 425 F.3d at 334 (noting that
an amendment expanding the class definition, did not "commence" a new
action under CAFA).
371. Pfizer, 417 F.3d at 726.
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Thus, CAFA does not generally apply to class actions that
372
were pending in state court prior to the effective date of the Act.
Notwithstanding this narrow construction of the commencement
issue, several strategies have emerged that have been at least
partially successful in removing state court class actions filed prior
to CAFA's effective date.
A. State ProceduralRules Defining When a Lawsuit is
Commenced May Provide an Opportunity to Remove
Class Actions Filed Priorto CAFA's Effective Date
The general consensus among those circuits that have
addressed the commencement issue "is that state law determines
when an action is commenced for purposes of CAFA." 73
Recognizing that "different legal systems understand [the] term
[commencement] differently," the Seventh Circuit elaborated that
"state [law] rather than federal practice must supply the rule of
decision."374 In many states, like Illinois, a suit is commenced
when the complaint is filed. 7 The fact that a defendant was
"served" after CAFA's effective date is simply irrelevant in those
jurisdictions.3 76 There are however, several states, such as
Minnesota, Connecticut, and New York, where service of process
commences the action. 7 Thus, actions filed in those states prior to

372. On the other hand, CAFA does apply to a class action filed in federal
court after its enactment, notwithstanding the existence of an identical statecourt class action filed prior to CAFA's effective date. Steinberg v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 2d 215, 222 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Price v. Berkeley
Nutraceuticals, Inc., No. 05-73169, 2005 WL 2649205, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct.
17, 2005). Under Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[a] civil
action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." Steinberg, 418 F.
Supp. 2d at 222. Therefore, the federal action does not "relate back" across
jurisdictional lines to an independently filed state-court action, despite the
similarity of the allegations made in both class actions.
373. Tmesys, 462 F.3d at 1319 (Eleventh Circuit); e.g. Natale, 424 F.3d at 44
(First Circuit); Braud, 445 F.3d at 803 (Fifth Circuit); Pfizer, 417 F.3d at 725
(Seventh Circuit); Plubell, 434 F.3d at 1071 (Eighth Circuit); Bush, 425 F.3d
at 686 (Ninth Circuit); see also Pritchett 11, 420 F.3d at 1094 (Tenth Circuit);
Knudsen I, 411 F.3d at 807 (Seventh Circuit). This approach is seemingly
consistent with pre-CAFA decisions; see, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117,
120 (1945) ("Whether any case is pending in the Illinois courts is a question to
be determined by Illinois law."); Cannon v. Kroeger Co., 837 F.2d 660, 664 (4th
Cir. 1988) ("It is clear that a federal court must honor state court rules
governing commencement of civil actions when an action is first brought in
state court and then removed to federal court.").
374. Schorsch, 417 F.3d at 750.
375. See Bush, 425 F.3d at 686 (interpreting California law).
376. See, e.g., Lussier, 2005 WL 2211094, at *3 (holding that under the
particular state law, an action is commenced when the lawsuit is filed).
377. See MINN. R. CIv. P. 3.01; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-45(a) (1958); Murphy
Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 351-52 (1999) (observing
that in New York, service of summons commences an action).
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CAFA's enactment could be removed to federal court where service
was obtained after its effective date.
Additionally, other jurisdictions provide that an action is
commenced by the filing of a complaint only if service is obtained
within a specified timeframe.78s Still other states equate commencement with the filing of a complaint so long as it is filed
with a "bonafide intention of having it immediately served."379
As a result, one district court concluded that because service
was not obtained within the ninety-day window contemplated by
Kansas' procedural rules, the action could be removed to federal
court by defendants who were not served until after CAFA's
effective date, despite the fact that the class action was filed in
state court prior to CAFA's enactment."8° A similar result was
reached by another district court when it concluded that plaintiff
did not file a state court class action with the bona fide intention of
having it immediately served. Thus, the defendants who were
served after CAFA's effective date were permitted to remove the
action to federal court despite the action being filed before CAFA
went into effect. 38'
Finally, where the original complaint filed prior to CAFA's
effective date was a legal nullity under a particular state's law,"8 2 a
subsequently filed post-CAFA pleading would commence a new
action because there would be nothing to which the amended
complaint can relate back. A right to remove the case to federal
court would be triggered as a result.'
Accordingly, a careful
review of the forum-state's procedural rules is necessary to
determine when an action is commenced, making it potentially
removable under this approach.

378. See, e.g., Dinkel, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 292 (holding that under Kansas'
procedural rules, the filing of a lawsuit commences an action only when
process is served within ninety days of that filing and if the suit is served after
that ninety-day window, the action is not deemed to have commenced until
service was obtained).
379. Main Drug Inc. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1317,
1321 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (applying Alabama's Rules of Civil Procedure (citing
Ward v. Saben Appliance Co., 391 So.2d 1030, 1035 (Ala. 1980))).
380. Dinkel, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 293.
381. Main Drug,455 F. Supp. 2d at 1323-24.
382. For example, under Illinois law, the filing of a lawsuit against an
individual who is deceased at the time of that filing is a legal nullity. See
Volkmar v. State Farm Mut. Automo. Ins. Co., 432 N.E.2d 1149, 1159 (5th
Dist. 1982). As stated in Volkmar, proceedings instituted against a deceased
person or a non-existent entity are considered void ab initio and do not invoke
the jurisdiction of an Illinois court. Id.
383. See Whitehead v. The Nautilus Group, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 2d 923, 926-27
(W.D. Ark. 2006) (holding plaintiffs original complaint filed prior to CAFA's
effective date was not a legal nullity under state law, and thus the amended
pleading related back, thereby rendering CAFA inapplicable).
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B. Some Types of Post-CAFA Amendments to Preexisting
Class Actions Trigger the Opportunity to Remove
Three different approaches have emerged on the issue of
whether a post-CAFA amendment to a state court pleading
"commences" a new action for purposes of removal under the Act.3"
Various district courts have taken an "absolutist position,"
concluding that because a civil action can only be commenced once,
no amendment to a pleading filed after CAFA's effective date can
trigger application of the Act.' However, both the Fifth and Tenth
Circuits have specifically rejected this approach.' As explained
below, every federal circuit that has addressed the issue has
concluded that some types of pleading amendments will commence
a new action removable under CAFA.
A second approach applies the law "governing the relationback of pleading amendments" to the commencement issue. 7 The
third approach emerges when a pleading amendment adds a
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits, while generally
defendant.
following the relation-back approach, have nevertheless concluded
that an amendment to a pleading that adds a defendant,
commences a new action under CAFA as to that defendant unless the amendment merely corrects a scrivener's error in a

384. Prime Care of Northeast Kan. LLC v. Humana Ins. Co., 447 F.3d 1284,
1285 (10th Cir. 2006).
385. Id. at 1286. Several district courts have rejected the relation-back
approach to the commencement issue under CAFA. Weekley v. Guidant Corp.,
392 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1067 (E.D. Ark. 2005), is the leading case in this regard.
Weekley involved a pleading amendment subsequent to CAFA's enactment
which sought the certification of a nationwide class. The district court
suggested that in various removal statutes Congress had employed the terms
"claim or cause of action" separate from "civil action" to distinguish when
removal of an entire proceeding in a civil case was authorized from where only
"a claim or cause of action in a civil action" could be removed. Id. at 1067-68.
The district court in Weekley concluded that CAFA's use of the term civil
action referred to the entire case, and concluded that "the whole proceeding
can only be commenced once." Id. at 1067-68 (citing Sneddon, 2005 WL
1593593, at *2). Accordingly, under this view, a new action cannot be
commenced when pleadings are amended irrespective of whether or not they
relate back, and removal under CAFA would not be permitted by pleading
amendments. Weekley, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 1068; see also Comes v. Microsoft
Corp., 403 F. Supp. 2d 897, 903 (S.D. Iowa 2005) (adopting Weekley's approach
and holding an amendment did not commence a new cause of action rendering
removal under CAFA inappropriate); Hot Springs County Solid Waste Auth. v.
United Health Group, No. Civ. 05-6065, 2006 WL 376545, at *2-3 (W.D. Ark.
Jan. 13, 2006) (applying the Weekley approach); Smith v. Collinsworth, No.
4:05CV01382-WRW, 2005 WL 3533133, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 21, 2005)
(involving a proposed amendment from a statewide to a nationwide class
where the court followed Weekley, but also concluded that even if the relation
back approach was applied, removal would still fail).
386. Braud, 445 F.3d at 803-06; Prime Care, 447 F.3d at 1287-89.
387. Prime Care, 447 F.3d at 1286.
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prior pleading."' The Tenth and Eighth Circuits apply a relationback analysis to all pleading amendments, even those that add a
new defendant.389 The relation-back approach and its variations
among the circuits are discussed in the following sections of this
article.
1.

The Relation-Back Approach to the Commencement Issue

In Knudsen I, the Seventh Circuit addressed the impact of a
post-CAFA amendment to a class action filed in state court prior to
CAFA's enactment. Knudsen I held that a mere change in the
definition of the class, even a significant one, does not trigger the
right to remove that action to federal court under CAFA 9 ° The
court in Knudsen I concluded that "[a] doctrine of 'significant
change' would go against the principle that the first virtue of any
jurisdictional rule is clarity and ease of implementation."391 In the
Seventh Circuit's view, a proposed change in the class definition
that merely expands the size of a putative class will not suffice to
invoke the Act's coverage.39 However, the Seventh Circuit in
Knudsen I recognized that certain types of amendments to an
existing action may trigger the right to remove under CAFA:
[A] new claim for relief (a new "cause of action" in state practice),
the addition of a new defendant, or any other step sufficiently
distinct that courts would treat it as independent for limitations
purposes, could well commence a new piece of litigation for federal
3
purposes even if it bears an old docket number for state purposes.
Knudsen I explained that even under preexisting law,
amendments to pleadings that add a federal claim where only
state-law claims had preexisted, or that add a new defendant open
"a new window of removal."394 It then "imagine [d]":
[A] similar approach will apply under the 2005 Act, perhaps
modeled on Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), which specifies when a claim
relates back to the original complaint (and hence is treated as part
of the original suit) and when it is sufficiently independent of the
original contentions that it must be treated as fresh litigation. 5
The Seventh Circuit subsequently explained that in Knudsen
I, it referenced Rule 15(c) merely "to illustrate the difference
between claims that relate back and those that do not."36 In this
388. E.g., Braud, 445 F.3d at 804; Schillinger, 425 F.3d at 333.
389. Prime Care, 447 F.3d at 1286 (citing Plubell, 434 F.3d at 1071-72).
390. Knudsen I, 411 F.3d at 807.

391. Id. at 806.
392. See Schorsch, 417 F.3d at 751 ("Amendments to class definitions do not
commence new suits.").
393.
394.
395.
396.

Knudsen 1, 411 F.3d at 807.
Id.
Id.
Schorsch, 417 F.3d at 750.
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regard "the relation-back concept is applied as an analytic tool, a
way of determining whether amended pleadings so change the
claims or parties as to be a new civil action." 97
Under this approach, an amendment to a state court class
action that does not relate back to the original pleading filed prior
to CAFA's effective date triggers the right to remove that action to
federal court. However, claims that do relate back would not be
removable under CAFA.39 Thus, under this approach, the forum
state's law that governs whether a claim set forth in an amended
pleading relates back to the original complaint for statute of
limitation purposes, also determines whether a preexisting action
is removable under CAFA. This presents an intriguing problem for
court and counsel. Theoretically, a new claim might relate back
under one state's law but not another, and the ability to
successfully remove a class action to federal court under CAFA
could turn on where the class action is filed.
2. Amendments Substituting Class Representativesor Changing
Class Definition
There currently exists a split in the circuits over whether an
amendment to a pleading which substitutes a new class
representative relates back to the original complaint. The Seventh
and Eighth Circuits have concluded that such an amendment does
not trigger a right of removal under CAFA.3" The Sixth Circuit
held that an amendment changing the class representative prior to
certification of a class "constituted a new action for purposes of
CAFA."4 °° The basis for the Sixth Circuit's conclusion is that
"unnamed putative class members are not technically parties to
the action prior to class certification." '0 i The Seventh Circuit
expressed a similar point of view in Jackson v. Resolution GGF
OY, 0 where it observed "as the case was not certified as a class
397. Werner v. KPMG LLP, 415 F. Supp. 2d 688, 700 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
398. Santamarina,466 F.3d at 573 ("An amended complaint kicks off a new
action only if under the procedural law of the state in which the suit is filed, it
does not 'relate back' to the original complaint.").
399. Plubell, 434 F.3d at 1073-74 (Eight Circuit); Phillips v. Ford Motor Co.,
435 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 2006).
400. Hall v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 05-2530, 2007 WL 215662,
at *3-4 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 2007).
401. Hall, 2007 WL 215662, at *4.
402. Jackson v. Resolution GGF OY, 136 F.3d 1130, 1132 (7th Cir. 1998); see
also In re Navigant Consulting, Inc., Sec. Lit., 275 F.3d 616, 619 (7th Cir.
2001), where the court explained: "Class members (other than the
representatives) are not parties; if they were, their citizenship would count for
diversity purposes of the complete-diversity requirement in suits under 28

U.S.C. § 1332, yet it is established that class members' citizenship is
disregarded."
Since under CAFA, the citizenship of the plaintiff class
members is now to be considered, this particular underpinning of the Seventh
Circuit's rationale concerning a pleading amendment which changes the class
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action, the only claims before the court are those of the plaintiff
personally." However, in the Seventh Circuit's view even after
certification, class members "are not litigants themselves. " 3
Should the result be different if the class representative is
substituted prior to class certification rather than afterwards?
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits' approach to the party status of
putative or unnamed class members appears to be in tension with
the Supreme Court's holding in Devlin v. Scardelletti.4" Devlin
recognized that unnamed class members may be considered
parties to a class action "for some purposes and not others. The
label 'party' does not indicate an absolute characteristic, but
rather a conclusion about the applicability of various procedural
rules that may differ based on context." 5 While Devlin recognized
that unnamed class members should not be considered parties for
diversity purposes in a traditional class action context, the Court
reached that conclusion because "considering [the citizenship of]
all class members for these purposes would destroy diversity in
almost all class actions." ' ° That concern is of no moment with
class actions encompassed by CAFA in light of its specified
approach for determining the existence of minimal diversity.
Moreover, Devlin reiterated that putative class members are
considered parties "in the sense that the filing of an action on
07
behalf of the class tolls a statute of limitations against them.""
Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that "[a] properly certified
class has a legal status separate from and independent of the
interest asserted by the named plaintiff." 8 As a result, after a
class has been certified, the fact that the class representative's
individual claim becomes moot does not render the class action
moot.4
A new class representative may be substituted and the
class action will continue on. When a class representative is
substituted prior to certification, it kicks off a new action from the
perspective of the newly added class representative.

representative or the class definition not commencing a new action for
purposes of CAFA can be questioned.
403. Schorsh, 417 F.3d at 750.
404. 536 U.S. 1 (2002).
405. Devlin, 536 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added).
406. Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10. Devlin's conclusion on this point was intended
to preserve traditional diversity jurisdiction in a class action context. In view
of CAFA's intent to broadly expand diversity jurisdiction over qualifying class
actions and Devlin's context - specific approach, the opposite conclusion would
likely now be searched in the context of a class action under CAFA. CAFA's
test for minimal diversity requires an examination of the citizenship of the
putative plaintiff class members.
407. Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10.
408. Whitlock v. Johnson, 153 F.3d 380, 384 (7th Cir. 1998).
409. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975).
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The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits merely addressed the
substitution of a new class representative. None of those cases
involved the addition of a new claim. Thus the defendants could
not claim that they were prejudiced by having to defend identical
allegations in the amended pleading.41 In rejecting the argument
that the substitution of a new class representative triggered a
right to remove under CAFA, the Seventh Circuit explained
"[slubstitution of unnamed class members for [the] named
plaintiffs ... is a common and normally an unexceptionable
('routine') feature of class action litigation both in the federal
courts and in the Illinois courts."' However, a class had already
been certified in that case when the substitution occurred.
Whereas in the Sixth and Eighth Circuit cases, the substitution of
the class representative occurred prior to class certification.412
Accordingly, whether a pleading amendment that adds or changes
the class representative triggers a right to remove under CAFA
may turn on whether the amendment occurs pre- or postcertification and the particular circuit involved." 3
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a "substantial
change" to the definition of a class does not trigger the right to
remove that action under CAFA."14 A proposed amendment to the
class definition merely expanding the size of a putative class does
not suffice to invoke the Act's coverage in the Seventh Circuit's
The Seventh Circuit's conclusion on this point again
view."'
appears to be rooted in the concept that "[cilass members are
represented vicariously but are not litigants themselves."'
However, it does not appear that all circuits agree with the
Seventh Circuit's position that any amendment to a class
definition inevitably relates back. In Cliff v. Payco General
American Credits, Inc.," plaintiff filed an action seeking to certify
a class of Florida residents. After the statute of limitations ran on
410. Plubell, 434 F.3d at 1073.
411. Phillips,435 F.3d at 787.
412. Plubell,434 F.3d at 1071.
413. See, e.g., Bemis v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2006 WL 1064067, at *6
(S.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2006) (amendment adding a new class representative who
was "an unnamed member of the original class action Complaint" and which
did not alter the class definition did not trigger a right to remove under
CAFA).
414. Knudsen I, 411 F.3d at 806-07.
415. See Schorsch, 417 F.3d at 751 ("Amendments to class definitions do not
commence new suits."); Schillinger, 425 F.3d at 334 ("[The expansion of a
proposed class [from a statewide to a nationwide class] does not change the
parties to the litigation nor does it add new claims.").
416. Schorsch, 417 F.3d at 750. As noted above, the Supreme Court in
Devlin rejected this type of across-the-board approach and recognized "that
nonnamed class members are parties to the proceedings in the sense of being
bound by the settlement." 536 U.S. at 10.
417. 363 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2004).
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one of his claims, plaintiff filed an amended complaint seeking to
represent not only a class of state residents, but also a nationwide
class."' Cliff held the amended pleading did not relate back
because plaintiffs initial complaint did not provide the defendant
with notice about the possibility of defending a nationwide class
and would unfairly prejudice the defendant.419 Cliff emphasized
that the case did not involve "a minor modification in the class
definition that slightly enlarged the class beyond the scope of the
class proposed in the original complaint."' Cliff recognized that
class definitions are frequently modified and emphasized that its
"opinion should not be understood to declare a rigid rule that any
amendments that modify and thus enlarge a class will not relate
back under any circumstances."'" Rather, such a determination
must be made on a case-by-case analysis.422
In reaching its conclusion, Cliff borrowed a principle from
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,422 that the
commencement of a class action must adequately notify a
defendant:
[NJot only of the substantive claims being brought against them, but
also of the number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs
who may participate in the judgment. Within the period set by the
statute of limitations, the defendants have the essential information
necessary to determine both the subject matter and size of the
prospective litigation ....
42

Thus, where a proposed amendment to a class definition triggers
the involvement of a different state's laws, includes citizens from
different jurisdictions, or geometrically increases the size or
number of putative classes and/or class members, careful
consideration of a possible removal of the action should be made in
light of Cliffs holding and its application of American Pipe to the
relation back issue. Clearly, a plaintiffs initial complaint in those
scenarios would not provide a defendant with all of the
information necessary to prepare a defense to class action claims
brought in the amended pleading. Following this rationale, one
district court recently concluded that an amended complaint which
sought to expand a class to include claimants from an additional

418. Id. at 1119.
419. Id. at 1132; see also Heaphy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. C05
5404RBL, 2005 WL 1950244, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 12, 2005) ("[Nlotice from
the initial individual complaint... cannot serve as 'adequate' notice of all
claims [that] might someday fall within the class definition.").
420. Cliff, 363 F.3d at 1133 n.16.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
424. Cliff, 363 F.3d at 1133 (quotingAmerican Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554-55).
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sixteen-year period did not relate back to the original pleading and
held removal to be proper under CAFA. 25
Seventh Circuit practitioners should recognize, however, that
in Schillinger, just as in Cliff, plaintiffs sought to expand their
action from one asserting a statewide class into one involving a
putative nationwide class. The Seventh Circuit in Schillinger
concluded "that the expansion of the class was not significant
enough to create a new claim or new action" for purposes of
CAFA. 26 The fact that the defendant would be forced to analyze
the putative new class members' claims under state laws that
were different "than if it was facing only
427 a class of Illinois
plaintiffs," did not warrant a different result.
However, the Seventh Circuit offered the following comment
on its approach to the issues presented in Schillinger:
We recognize, however, that this is a complex question. CAFA may
make state rules about statutes of limitations irrelevant to the type
of commencement that is necessary for federal removal ....
We
prefer to save this complex issue for another day, when the choice of
428
law and interpretation of federal law will govern the outcome.
The Fifth Circuit in Braud4u similarly observed "[it is less certain
whether state law provides the applicable rules for the relation
back analysis." ° The Fifth Circuit chose not to resolve this issue
because in the case before it, the result was the same under either
option. The Tenth Circuit also noted the issue but passed on
addressing it by finding that it was "unlikely that a choice between
federal
" 1 and state law [was] necessary to [their] resolution of [the]

case.

43

3. Amendments Adding New Defendants
Under the approach taken by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits,
when a plaintiff files an amended pleading adding a new
defendant, a new action is "commenced" as to that defendant. 2
425. Senterfitt v. Suntrust Mortgage, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1380-81
(S.D. Ga. 2006).
426. Schillinger,425 F.3d at 332.
427. Id. at 334.
428. Id. at 335.
429. Braud, 445 F.3d at 807 n.14.

430. Id.
431. Prime Care, 447 F.3d at 1289 n.6 ("At this juncture, however, [the court

does] not express an opinion as to whether federal or state law should
control.").
432. See Schorsch, 417 F.3d at 749; Knudsen 1, 411 F.3d at 807; Braud, 445
F.3d at 804 (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit that "amendments that add a
defendant 'commence' the civil action as to added party"); see also Adams,
2005 WL 186237, at *4 ("Plaintiffs decision to add ... a defendant presents

precisely the situation in which it can be and should be said that a new action
has commenced for purposes of removal pursuant to CAFA." (internal
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Thus, defendants added to state court class actions after CAFA's
enactment have the right to remove the action under CAFA."3
The Seventh Circuit in Schillinger clarified that when a postCAFA addition of a defendant to a preexisting action was the
result of a "scrivener's error," removal under the Act is not
permitted.' Additionally, an amendment which merely corrects a
"misnomer" does not commence a new action for purposes of
CAFA."5 Clearly in the case of a misnomer - suing the right
party by the wrong name - an amended pleading relates back and
its filing does not commence a new action for purposes of CAFA."'
However, where a previously unknown defendant is added in an
amended pleading, the misnomer exception does not apply. 7 On
this last point, "[iut is important to maintain the distinction
between correcting an honest error in the name of a correctly
named party and joining a new party in the litigation for the first
time under the guise of a claim of misnomer." 8

quotation marks omitted)); Robinson, 2006 WL 470592, at *2 (same).
433. The Tenth Circuit, in rejecting this approach, suggested that it
conflates "two concepts that should be kept distinct: a substantive basis for
removal (here the federal action created by CAFA) and a procedural
opportunity to effect removal on that substantive basis." Prime Care, 447 F.3d
at 1288-89 (emphasis in original). Additionally, the court relied upon the
Advisory Committee's comments to the 1966 Amendment to Rule 15(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and observed: "Especially telling here is the
Advisory Committee's pointed clarification that, when the addition of a
defendant satisfies relation-back criteria, characterization of the amendment
as a new proceeding is not responsive to the reality [sic], but is merely
question-begging; and to deny relation back is to defeat unjustly the claimant's
opportunity to prove his case." Id. at 1288 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, under the Tenth Circuit's approach to the commencement issue, a
relation-back analysis is made to all pleading amendments, even those which
add a new defendant.
434. See Schillinger, 425 F.3d at 333; Beegal v. Park West Gallery, No. 055625, 2006 WL 2645123, at *5-6 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2006) (remanding a class
action where the state superior court's order which certified a worldwide class
rather than a nationwide one was the result of a clerical error).
435. See New Century Health Quality Alliance Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Kan., 2005 WL 2219827, at *4-5 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 13, 2005) (noting
that where defendant's corporate structure is complex and confusing,
amending the complaint to name the correct corporate defendant and dropping
the incorrectly named defendant does not trigger the right to remove under
CAFA); Eufaula Drugs, Inc. v. Scripsolutions, No. 2:05CV370-A, 2005 WL
2465746, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 6, 2005) (making clear that an amendment to
correct error in naming a defendant does not add a defendant or "commence" a
new action); Werner, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 700 (same).
436. New Century Health, 2005 WL 2219827, at *5.
437. See, e.g., Tiffany v. Hometown Buffet, Inc., No. C06-2524SBA, 2006 WL
1749557, at *6-8 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2006) (applying California law).
438. Id. at *6 (quoting Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court, 206
Cal. Rptr. 654, 657 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)).
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4. Amendments Adding New Claims
In Knudsen II, the Seventh Circuit held an amended pleading
that added a novel claim triggered a right to remove under CAFA
where the original pleading did not supply notice of the events
that underlie that new claim." Knudsen II stemmed from a postCAFA amendment which sought to hold Liberty Mutual
"responsible for all policies issued by any subsidiary or affiliate.""0
Since the claims against those subsidiaries and affiliates were not
based on the same underlying acts as the claim set forth in the
original pleading, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Liberty
Mutual faced new claims for relief."
In light of Knudsen H, the key is whether the original
pleading provided the defendant with "notice of the facts that form
the basis of the claim asserted" in the amended complaint."2 As
one district court explained, the relevant inquiry is "not whether
every individual factual element of the [amended] claim is
identifical to every individual factual element of the [original]
claim.""' That type of argument "misconstrues the level of
generality at which the relation-back inquiry must be
conducted."' Minor amendments to the pleadings clearly will not
trigger the right to remove under this standard." 5 If the plaintiffs
439. Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (Knudsen I/), 435 F.3d 755 (7th Cir.
2006).
440. Id. at 756.
441. Id. at 757-58. See Heaphy, 2005 WL 1950244, at *3-5 (holding that an
amendment adding a new lead plaintiff who was not a member of the prior
putative class and asserting a new cause of action which was filed after a
motion for class certification had been denied were "sufficiently independent of
the original contentions" to trigger the right to remove under CAFA);
Plummer, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 1313-1316 (holding that an amended pleading
which for the first time sought to certify a class and which added fraud and
bad faith claims was a de facto commencement of a new suit and therefore was
removable under CAFA); Moniz, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 38 (holding the
amendment of a class action involving a price fixing conspiracy for certain
rubber and urethane products adding allegations about neoprene, a new
product, added a distinct and novel claim that triggered the right to remove
under CAFA).
442. See In re Audi, 2006 WL 1543752, at *3 (holding an amendment adding
a strict liability claim related back to plaintiffs' original consumer fraud claim
because both claims arose out of the same transaction or occurrence).
443. Id. at *4.
444. Id.
445. See, e.g., Judy, 2005 WL 2240088, at *1-3 (finding that removal under
CAFA was not triggered by an amendment which the court characterized as
adding "additional factual allegations which elaborate [plaintiffs] original
claims" and which "refined" the class allegations); McAnaney v. Astoria Fin.
Corp., 233 F.R.D. 285, 288-89 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a proposed
amendment that added a reference to CAFA's jurisdictional provisions was
futile because the proposed amended pleading related back to the original
complaint, and the case was therefore commenced as of the original filing date,
thereby rendering CAFA inapplicable); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
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original claim did not provide the defendant with the information
necessary to defend the newly asserted one, then removal would
seemingly be appropriate under the circumstances. 6
The Seventh Circuit in Schorsch appeared to suggest that an
existing defendant may only remove the newly added claim rather
than the entire lawsuit."' However, this suggestion flies in the
face of CAFA's plain language which provides: "A class action may
be removed to a district court... without regard to whether any
defendant is a citizen of the State in which the action is brought,
except that such action may be removed by any defendant without
the consent of all defendants."'
Based upon this language, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that any single defendant can remove the
entire class action.! 9 As one district court explained, "[u]nder
removal practice, the entire lawsuit is removable or not removable,
not merely the claims against particular defendants."450

XIII. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO RELIANCE ON
STATE LAW RELATION-BACK PRINCIPLES

The current approach addressing when a class action
commences for purposes of CAFA relies on state law relation-back
principles that admittedly raise several knotty questions. Under
that approach, state law controls the door to the federal
courthouse. While a number of state relation-back statutes are at
least partially modeled upon Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, it cannot be gainfully argued that there is any
uniformity in the text or the interpretation of the fifty state laws
addressing when a pleading relates back for statute of limitations
purposes. The more restrictive a state's relation-back statute, the
Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 1:00-1898, 2006 WL 1004725, at *5-7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17,
2006) (clarifying that an amendment making the class definition "more
specific" and adding a nuisance claim based on the same factual allegations
from the original pleading did not trigger the right to remove under CAFA); In
re Audi, 2006 WL 1543752, at *2 (explaining that a "routine" amendment to a
complaint is not deemed sufficient to commence a new suit under CAFA).
446. See Santamarina,466 F.3d at 574 (explaining that unless "the original
complaint is so cursory that someone reading the amended complaint would

not know it referred to the same conduct charged in the original" the filing of
an amended pleading would relate back and a right to remove under CAFA
would not be triggered by that amendment).
447. Schorsch, 417 F.3d at 750.
448. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (Supp. 2005) (emphasis added).
449. See Braud, 445 F.3d at 808 (holding that it is the "action" that is
removable, not claims against particular defendants); Dinkel, 400 F. Supp. 2d

at 294 (permitting three defendants against whom plaintiffs action was
commenced after CAFA's effective date to remove the entire action against all
defendants rather than simply the claims brought against them).
450. Dinkel, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 293; see also Robinson, 2006 WL 470592, at
*3 ("Under CAFA, any single defendant can remove.., and the entire lawsuit
is removed, not merely the claims against the removing defendant.").
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more likely a pleading amendment will result in a succesful
removal to federal court. As a result, the right to remove a class
action to federal court under CAFA could theoretically change
depending on the state in which a class action was originally filed.
Thus, the current approach to the commencement issue could
potentially lead to inconsistent results depending on the vagaries
of state law.
CAFA was enacted to "restore the intent of the framers of the
United States Constitution by providing for Federal court
consideration of interstate cases of national importance under
diversity jurisdiction."
Federal courts are intended to be an
independent judicial system capable of enforcing federal law.
CAFA was specifically enacted to curb certain abusive state court
class action practices. However, the current approach to the
commencement issue ignores those interests by permitting state
law to control the invocation of federal court jurisdiction.
As noted above, the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have
expressed some uncertainty over whether state law or Rule 15(c)
should be applied, but have not addressed the issue. This should
come as no surprise. Historically, "[t]here has been considerable
uncertainty whether a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction
is free to apply the relation back principle embodied in Rule 15(c)
instead of a conflicting state rule on the subject."'52 The circuits
have avoided answering the question of whether state or federal
law should control by concluding the test under state law was
functionally the equivalent as under Rule 15(c). 45 Adding to the
conundrum is that the "line between 'substance' and 'procedure'
shifts as the legal context changes.
Each implies different
variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is
used."'
Indeed, a state statute of limitations is "treated as

451. Plubell,434 F.3d at 1073.

452. 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHER R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1503, 167 (2d ed. 1990).

453. See, e.g., Schorsch, 417 F.3d at 751 ("Illinois has a relation-back rule

that is functionally identical to Rule 15(c), however, so we need not fret over
fine points."); Plubell, 434 F.3d at 1072 ("The Missouri Supreme Court
interprets Rule 55.33(c) to embody Rule 15(c)'s rationale."); Prime Care, 447
F.3d at 1289 n.6 ("Given the essentially identical test of Rule 15(c) and Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 215(c)... it appears unlikely that a choice between federal and
state law is necessary to our resolution of this case."). However, this does not
answer the question involving those states "that have a clearly different

doctrine of relation back than is prescribed for the federal courts." See 6A
WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 435, § 1503, at 168.
454. Hanna v. Plumber, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (internal quotation marks
omitted). There are three different contexts in which a particular rule may be
classified as substantial or procedural:
[When] determining whether it is within the scope of a court's
rulemaking power; when resolving questions of conflict of laws; or when
determining whether to apply state or federal law. These three contexts
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procedural" and therefore governed by the forum state's law for
choice of law purposes under the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
and "substantive" for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction. 5'
In Hanna, the Supreme Court concluded that in a diversity
action, when a federal procedural rule addressed a specific topic or
issue, it trumped a conflicting state law, even when use of the
state law would achieve a different outcome.456 Hanna suggests
that Rule 15(c) should be applied in this context. Complicating the
matter however, is that the amendment triggering removal is
made in state court rather than federal court. However, because
the use of Rule 15(c) in this context does not purport to control
state court procedures or enlarge any substantive right, its
application seemingly does not violate any constitutional
guarantee or the Rules Enabling Act.457
Reliance upon state law relation-back principles precludes the
goal of a uniform approach and a consistency in the application of
a federal law (CAFA) as well as the access to federal court that
CAFA was intended to provide. It arguably runs headlong into
"the first virtue of any jurisdictional rule [which] is clarity and
ease of implementation" that initially led the Seventh Circuit to
reject the doctrine of "substantial change" in Knudsen V'
In light of the complexity of these issues, an alternative
approach based on principles drawn from American Pipe, is offered
as a solution. Admittedly, American Pipe's tolling doctrine has its
legitimate critics.4"9 Additionally, not all jurisdictions follow the
doctrine across state or jurisdictional lines.'
However, in this
context the priniciples being drawn upon are not being used for
tolling purposes, but rather as an analytical tool, in a fashion
similar to the current use of state law relation-back principles.

present three very different kinds of problems, and factors that are of
decisive importance in making the substance procedure classification for

one context may be irrelevant in the other contexts.
19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHER R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4508, at 232.

455. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723-27 (1988); Jinks v.
Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 464-65 (2003).
456. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463-64.
457. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000).
458. Knudsen 1, 411 F.3d at 806.
459. See, e.g., Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354
(1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (recognizing the potential for abuse under
American Pipe). Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined in Powell's
concurrence. Id.
460. See, e.g., Portwood v. Ford Motor Co., 701 N.E.2d 1102, 1104 (Ill. 1998)
("[Viery few states to date have even considered the issue of crossjurisdictional tolling, let alone adopt it."); In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436
F.3d 782, 793-97 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that a state class action raising state
law antitrust claims does not toll the statute of limitations in a crossjurisdictional context for a federal class action under the Clayton Act).
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Based on the Eleventh Circuit's approach in Cliff - a case
addressing the relation back of an amendment to a class action the application of certain principles from American Pipe in this
context offer a practical alternative to the issues surrounding
CAFA's application to class actions that were pending prior to its
effective date.
First, the American Pipe doctrine was specifically directed at
class action practice and "is not inconsistent with the purposes
Therefore, it would be
served by statutes of limitations." ' '
consistent with the current relation-back approach to CAFA's
effective date that is based on a statute of limitation principle.
Second, "different or peripheral claims to which the defendant was
not fairly placed on notice by the [original] class suit are not
protected under American Pipe." 2 As Justice Powell explained, a
defendant should normally not be prejudiced by tolling because,
"[w]ithin the period set by the statute of limitations, the
defendants have the essential information necessary to determine
both the subject matter and size of the prospective litigation." 3
The same rationale can be applied to CAFA's commencement
issue. Where a new claim or a proposed amendment to a class
definition filed after CAFA's effective date falls outside the
parameters of American Pipe because the original pre-CAFA
action did not provide the defendant with all of the information
necessary to defend the new claim or claims brought on behalf of
the newly added class members, because of either the involvement
of different states' law(s), different time periods, or the addition of
new putative class action members from different jurisdictions,
removal under CAFA would be permitted. Such amendments so
change the nature of class action litigation as to amount to the
commencement of a new action. Additionally, it would provide an
adequate filter so that federal courts are not flooded with newly
removed actions, which is an unstated, but practical consideration
at work in this area. Moreover, this approach would address the
concern about the relevancy of state procedural rules driving the
application of a federal statute in federal court while also
of
providing
some
clarity
and
consistency
hopefully
implementation to this problem.
XIV. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CAFA
ON STATE COURT CLASS ACTION PRACTICE

While CAFA will limit the number of multistate and national
class actions that are filed, one of its unintended consequences
may be to increase the number of coordinated state court class

461. Crown, 462 U.S. at 352.
462. Id. at 354-55 (Powell, J., concurring).
463. Id. (emphasis added).
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action filings in an attempt to take advantage of CAFA's "home
state" and "local controversy" exceptions built into its minimal
diversity rule. The filing of multiple state-wide class actions in
various local jurisdictions challenging the same product defect or
contesting the same business practice will at least in the short run
increase the cost of defense and increase the possibility of
inconsistent rulings or judgments in those actions. Thus, one of
CAFA's unintended consequences may be that it increases rather
than reduces the cost of defending class action claims.
CAFA will also likely shift to federal court many indirect
purchaser class actions filed under state antitrust laws.4 " Indirect
purchasers are parties who claim to have overpaid for a given
product due to the alleged anticompetitive practices of one or more
defendants. Indirect purchasers, as the term suggests, do not
purchase the product directly from the defendant, but rather from
another party in the product's distribution chain which was also
overcharged due to the same allegedly anticompetitive practices.
A party who purchases the product directly from the defendant
may sue for damages under federal antitrust law. However,
indirect purchasers (consumers) typically can only seek injunctive
4 65
relief under Illinois Brick Co. v.Illinois.
Illinois Brick prompted
more than two-thirds of the states to enact legislation which allow
indirect purchasers to sue for treble damages under state antitrust
laws.466 This means that as a result of CAFA, federal courts will be
called upon to interpret and develop those states' antitrust laws.467
CONCLUSION

Only time will tell whether CAFA accomplishes its purpose of
directing large class actions to federal court. While CAFA appears
to have lessened the number of actions in which a multistate or
nationwide class is sought, it will likely produce a proliferation of
state-wide actions invoking CAFA's "home state" and "local
controversy" jurisdictional exemptions.
Following the enactment of PSLRA in 1995, class counsel
engaged in a strategy of shifting securities fraud class actions to
state court which prompted Congress three years later to enact
SLUSA. We may see history repeat itself with class counsel
adopting specific strategies in an attempt to dodge CAFA's
expansion of federal court jurisdiction. Thus, CAFA's immediate
effect will likely result in the proliferation of coordinated, state

464. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., No. 05-666, 2006 WL
999955, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2006).
465. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).

466. E.g. In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 2006 WL 999955, at *1.
467. Id.
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class action filings in an attempt to take advantage of CAFA's onethird and two-third's rules.

